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Executive Summary 
 
Discourses on nature protection mainly focus on the effectiveness of protected areas 
models in reaching their central goal, which is to protect the nature. Little attention is 
given to the influence of nature protection methods on conflict escalation.  
 
The focus of this paper is the influence that protected areas have on the local 
population in West Subsaharan Africa. More precisely, relying on a structured, 
focused comparison, the thesis investigates whether the design and implementation 
that relies on a community-based approach is more effective in preventing conflict 
escalation than the design and implementation based on the conservationist approach, 
in the West African context. 
 
Two protected areas, implementing two very different approaches to nature protection 
are investigated: (i) the W Park between Burkina Faso, Niger and Benin which was 
created on a conservationist model; becoming a reserve with restricted access in order 
to keep the nature protected from external interferences. And (ii) the APT 
(Transboundary Protected Area), situated between Guinea and Guinea Bissau which 
was founded on a community-based model; following the idea that the population 
needs to get involved in every step of the park implantation. 
 
Based on the analyses it is suggested that the community-based approach applied in a 
correct manner, is more effective in preventing conflict escalation. However, the 
community-based approach has many pitfalls. If not applied correctly it could create 
inequities that potentially could make it as vulnerable to conflict escalation as the 
implementation and design based on the conservationist approach. 
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1. Introduction  
 
In the last forty years the number of Protected Areas (hereafter written as PAs) 
worldwide has grown to more than 100,000 (Kothari, Lockwood et al. 2006). This 
trend is expected to continue over the next years (Ibid), and conflicts might arise and 
escalate; therefore, there is a need for deeper understanding of the  implementation and 
management of PAs (FAO 2003). Furthermore, as pointed out by Birkegård, great 
effort is spent in developing innovative systems of nature management, while little 
energy is given over to analysing the multitude of on-going projects (1993:28).  
 
According to the World Conservation Union (IUCN), “nature protection occurs when 
an area of land and/or sea is especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of 
biological diversity, and of natural and associated cultural resources, and managed 
through legal or other effective means” (IUCN 1994). This definition contains a 
number of different ways to protect nature. Discourses on nature protection mainly 
focus on the effectiveness of protected areas models in reaching their main goal, which 
is to protect nature. Others, however, focus on the sustainable development connected 
to the implementation of protected areas. Examples of different approaches are given 
from the literature on the “tragedy of the commons”, where issues on common 
resources are discussed in relation to rights of access to them (Hardin 1968).1 It is not 
unusual that some protectionists consider the local population an obstacle to 
safeguarding nature, and different strategies are developed to reduce their influence.2 
Those park managers favour PAs based on a conservationist approach, with little role 
played by the local population (paragraph 1.1.1). Whereas, other protectionists support 
a community-based approach where the local population is involved both in the 
creation and management of the PA (paragraph 1.1.2). However, while the literature 
on the natural environment is quite large and diffuse, studies on methods of 
establishment and management of PAs are restricted to technical papers (Kothari, 
                                                
1 On the topic see for example: Birgegård (1993). 
2 In this thesis nature protection and nature safeguard will be used interchangeably. With the term protectionists 
I intend the managers, ecologist, etc. that have as a goal the nature protection of an area. It will be used 
interchangeably with the terms park managers and conservationists.  
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Lockwood et al. 2006). They answer questions of efficacy in protecting the 
environment and/or bringing benefits to the local population. Very little attention is 
given to the influence of nature protection methods on conflict escalation.  
 
As a contribution to filling the gap in the available literature, this thesis will take a 
closer look at PAs; shifting the focus towards the conflicts that can arise when an area 
is addressed to protection. I suppose that different approaches to nature protection can 
influence the occurrence of conflicts. The types of conflicts that can occur can be 
divided into two main categories: (i) conflicts between the local population and the 
PAs’ management and (ii) conflicts within the local communities.3 These clashes are 
obviously problematic for the actors involved, making the prevention of conflicts a 
goal in itself, but conflicts can also undermine the goal of protecting nature. 
Accordingly, a reduced number of quarrels should also facilitate the protection of 
nature. Nevertheless, in this study no evaluation is made regarding which of those two 
approaches performs better in preserving nature. My focus explicitly addresses conflict 
escalation related to the implementation of PAs. 
 
I have chosen to focus on the influence that protected areas have on the local 
population in West Subsaharan Africa. More precisely I investigate two different 
protected areas that have two very different approaches to nature protection. One is the 
W Park between Burkina Faso, Niger and Benin; it has colonial roots and it is based 
on a conservationist approach. The W Park was created on the model of a reserve with 
restricted access in order to keep nature protected from external interferences. 4   
 
The second protected area analyzed is situated between Guinea and Guinea Bissau 
(APT Guinea-Guinea Bissau), and it is based on the idea that the population needs to 
                                                
3 My understanding of conflict in this thesis is of a social condition that arises when two or more actors struggle 
because they have incompatible or opposing needs, wishes, or demands over resources (or perceived as such by 
the actors). Conflicts over natural resources can take place at different levels and with different intensity 
(confusion and frustration, disagreements, quarrels, intense confrontations, violent actions, etc.). The conflicts 
treated in this thesis are mostly local, however some go beyond local interactions, engaging stakeholders and 
processes at different levels. Conflict will be used interchangeably with the terms clash and quarrel. For more 
information on conflict and natural resource management see: Buckles, D. (1999).  
4 In this area the river Niger makes several sharp turns, which together form the shape of the letter 'W' from 
which the park takes its name. For interactive maps of the park see: http://www.multimap-parcw.org/map.swf   
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get involved in every step is an elaboration of a similar figure from the park 
implementation, including the individuation of its shape and location.5  
 
The goal of this investigation is to see whether the design and implementation that 
relies on the community-based approach is more effective in preventing conflict 
escalation between conservationists and local people, as well as within local 
communities, than the design and implementation based on the conservationist 
approach, in the West African context.  
 
In starting this research I imagined that the hypothesis would be proven, showing with 
a good margin that the APT community-based approach is less conflict prone then the 
W Park conservationist approach. The reasons for this are to be found in my field 
experiences, which gave me the impression that people were struggling more around 
the periphery of the W Park than in the APT. In addition, I personally sympathized 
more with the APT inclusive approach than the W Park authoritarian one. 
Nevertheless, as this thesis will show, things are not as straightforward, and my 
expectations have been proven slightly wrong.   
 
The next part will offer an introduction to the two different approaches to nature 
conservation analyzed here. The chapter identifies the research question that guides the 
thesis, discusses the methodology used to deal with the research question, and outlines 
the structure of the thesis.  
 
1.1 Two approaches to nature conservation 
1.1.1 The W Park - conservationist model 
The protection of wildlife in Africa began in the 19th century to safeguard big 
mammals in game reserves for the use of the colonialist (Child 2004; Grove and 
Anderson 1987). This tradition became the most widespread method of wildlife 
protection: a conservationist model comparable to a fortress (Himmelfarb 2006). In 
                                                
5 APT stands for Aire Protégée Transfrontalière [Transboundary Protected Area]. 
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this model protection is achieved through fences and blocked interaction with the 
external world. Decisions are taken top-down, with scarce or non-existent interaction 
with the local population (Kamugisha, Stahl et al. 1997; Kothari, Lockwood et al. 
2006; Grove and Anderson 1987; Himmelfarb 2006). It has been stated that the 
creators of these parks often perceive the resistance of the local population to be a 
result of ignorance and misunderstanding (Neumann 1998).  
 
Supporters of this approach believe that by isolating the park from external 
interferences, the flora and fauna are efficiently protected. Therefore, the preservation 
of the environment and the maintenance of biodiversity are the goals that justifies the 
conservationist approach (Kamugisha, Stahl et al. 1997; Kothari, Lockwood et al. 
2006).  
 
In the 1980s, sustainable development became a major concern in the international 
arena. This led to an increased attention towards clashes between park managers and 
the local population. One of the outcomes was the softening of the conservationist 
approach through the introduction of buffer zones. Buffer zones are understood as 
portions of land adjacent to and encircling the park, where relations between the 
natural environment and people are promoted (Brown 1992). Buffer zones are 
intended to reduce the direct impact on the PAs while trying to provide benefits to the 
local population (Wells, Hannah et al. 1992; Kamugisha, Stahl et al. 1997; Neumann 
1998). The implementation of the W Park began in 1937 based on the conservationist 
approach, with the addition of a buffer zone in 1984.  
 
1.1.2 The APT Guinea – community-based approach  
A conservation model that more actively involves the local population is the 
community-based approach.6 Kothari, Lockwood et al., describe the move towards the 
community-based approach as a paradigm shift brought mainly by the following 
                                                
6 “Community-based” is an expression widely used in different fields of research. It is therefore difficult to give 
a general definition of it. However, my understanding of it, in this thesis, is of an approach to conservation that 
takes great account of the local populations at different stages of the PA’s implementation and management. 
Problems connected to the use of this concept will be discussed in the next chapters.  
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factors: (i) a better understanding of human beings’ role in shaping enivronments; (ii) 
the increased awareness of local communities’ culture, knowledge and rights; (iii) the 
democratization and decentralization of power, etc. (2006). Furthermore, supporters of 
this approach believe that rival attitudes between conservationists and the local 
population may increase local resentments towards wildlife protection. This 
resentment develops into the idea that governments are more concerned with the 
survival of plants and animals than that of human beings (Ghimire 1991). 
Consequentially, clashes between the locals and the administration might arise. 
 
In the community-based approach the local population has a participatory role in the 
design, implementation and management of the protected area. The idea is to create a 
synergy between the population’s prosperity and nature conservation, linking them 
(Wells, Hannah et al. 1992; Kamugisha, Stahl et al. 1997; Neumann 1998). This 
approach is increasingly employed, with a wide range of different applications, the 
APT being one of them. As will be later illustrated, the APT approach is based on a 
deep understanding of the local context; taking into great consideration the 
peculiarities of West African societies, with their traditional as well as their state 
power systems (paragraph 2.2). The community-based approach is linked to the idea of 
sustainable development and has gained significant support from the international 
community.   
 
The analysis conducted in chapter four will illustrate that both methods contain some 
pitfalls and concerns related to their implementation. Here it can be briefly anticipated 
that in the W Park problems seem to be mainly the consequences of enforced 
displacement of the local population, and of clashes between two logics 
(legality/legitimacy), each transforming space into territory through different 
strategies, those of the conservationists and those of the local population (Turco 
2002b). In the APT challenges are related to the difficulties of correctly identifying 
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territorial structures and the interlocutors, with consequent risk of fallacy and feelings 
of inequity (Arbore, Leone et al. 2005).7  
 
1.1.3 Significance of the study  
As mentioned above, the existing studies analyzing environmental protection focus 
primarily on evaluating the efficacy of those models in reaching their goal of 
protecting the natural environment. More recent studies focus on the capacity of 
bringing development to the population that lives close to the PAs. Nevertheless, there 
is a lack of investigation concentrating on the clashes that nature protection might 
provoke. The aim of this thesis is to contribute towards filling this gap and investigate 
whether the design and the implementation of West African PAs can influence 
potential conflicts between conservation managers and the local population, as well as 
within the local population itself.  Therefore, this study does not analyze whether one 
of those two approaches performs better at preserving nature.  
 
The standard of living of people in close proximity to PAs can depend on the choices 
made by the PAs’ resource managers (Kothari, Lockwood et al. 2006). Often when a 
park is implemented people have to be displaced; many need to change their habitual 
activities (find a new home, stop hunting in a certain place, find a different area to 
exploit, find new ways to secure income, etc.), (Himmelfarb 2006). These factors are 
often a source of conflicts. Therefore, it would be interesting to see which procedures 
of PA implementation can positively affect the relationship between the PA and the 
local population. In this thesis I will specifically explore how the W Park and the APT 
were designed and implemented, and how the local population coped with the 
introduction of these two protected areas in relation to conflict escalation. This thesis 
is an attempt to contribute to the debate around nature management and ultimately, the 
prevention of environmental conflict on a local scale.  
 
                                                
7 For an introduction to the notions of legality and legitimacy, territorial structures and interlocutors alluded to 
here, please see chapter two.  
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1.2. Hypothesis, Method and Research Question 
1.2.1 Hypothesis 
As already outlined, nature protection occurs when a portion of land and/or sea is 
especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity and 
associated cultural resources (IUCN 1994). The W Park and the APT exemplify two 
different approaches to nature management. They share the same aim, which is to 
protect nature; however, how they relate to the local population varies. My assumption 
is that the design and implementation of a PA can influence the occurrence of conflict 
escalation. More specifically, I want to explore whether a community-based PA is 
more effective in avoiding conflicts than a PA based on the conservationist approach.  
The lack of previous research on this aspect made me decide to use material from my 
direct field experience in the W Park and in the APT. My fieldwork in those areas was 
carried out between spring 2004 and spring 2005. The fieldwork in the W Park (spring 
2004) concerned a research project on the nomadic shepherds in and around the W 
Park. The work in the APT (fall 2004 and spring 2005) was qualitative and 
quantitative fieldwork research for the collection and elaboration of useful data 
necessary to produce the APT’s management plan.8 Furthermore, I was interested in 
relating this research to West African countries, where the social structures are often 
characterized by a duality; the heritage of the introduction of the colonial power 
system overlapping with the traditional one (chapter two). The two cases analyzed 
served to answer the following research question: 
 
Is the community-based design and implementation more effective in preventing 
conflict escalation than the design and implementation based on the conservationist 
approach?  
 
To understand the dynamics between protected areas and the local populations in West 
Sub-Saharan Africa I needed to investigate the concepts on which the design of the W 
Park and APT are based, and the way these protected areas are implemented.  
                                                
8 Prof. A. Turco, University of L’Aquila – Italy, supervised both studies. The reports can be requested from the 
author or from the PAs’ administrations (ECOPAS for the W Park, and AGIR for the APT Guinea). 
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As will be shown more extensively in chapter two, the W Park’s design and 
implementation are based on the idea of nature protection through separating an area 
from human interaction. Its implementation started in 1937 and continued until the late 
1950s, incorporating a top-down decision-making process, which entailed scarce 
interaction with the local population. The W Park is now one component in the more 
extended WAP ecological complex, which includes the ‘W’, Arly and Pendjari parks, 
along with neighboring hunting areas and reserves.  
 
The APT is a more recent project and is the youngest branch of a more extensive 
project called AGIR.9 As explained earlier, the APT design and implementation are 
based on a deep understanding of the local context. They rely on a human 
geographical approach based on territorial structures (Turco 1999). I will explain 
more extensively in the next chapter what is understood by territorial structures. Here 
it will suffice to mention that they are social and political constructions, created by 
human beings in order to administrate the reality (Arbore, Leone et al. 2005). The 
starting point is that the space is chaotic until humans symbolically and materially 
elaborate it, transforming it into an organised territory (Turco 1988; 1999). Then the 
territorial structures become the organised shapes of the territory, for example 
associations, state, religious hierarchy, etc. That means that the creation of the APT is 
based on a deep understanding of both well known and less well known aspects of 
West Africa’s territorial structures, from the state’s administrative hierarchy to the 
traditional order of social life (as for example the village chief, the land chief, youth 
groups, etc.), (Arbore, Leone et al. 2005; Turco 2005; Vinciguerra 2005).  
 
The main difference between the two approaches is thus the degree of consideration of 
what is in the territory before the implementation of the protected area, and the degree 
of involvement of the local population in the decision making process. Nevertheless, 
both the W Park and the APT are characterized by interventionist approaches, since 
                                                
9 The other three components of AGIR are (i) a PA between Guinea and Mali, (ii) the National Park of Niokolo 
Koba and the National Park of Badiar and their peripheries between Guinea and Senegal, and finally (iii) the 
National Park of Haut Niger and its periphery in Guinea (fig. 6 paragraph 4.1.2). 
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their implementation results from external initiatives (colonial power, external donors, 
etc.).  
 
As will be shown in this thesis, the different approaches applied in the two PAs can 
influence the occurrence of conflict escalation both between PAs and local people and 
within local communities, with less conflict occurring in the APT compared to the W 
Park.  
 
1.2.2 Method 
During the research process a number of methodological challenges emerged, such as 
defining in a meaningful and resolute manner the hypothesis, the design, the data 
collection and analysis and the final exposure. In addition, choosing the scientific 
approach to use in the study was itself a challenge. Depending on the angle preferred, 
these approaches can vary from strict quantitative analysis to open qualitative studies. 
As my interest is to analyze whether different design created different outcomes 
between two differently protected areas, I chose to rely on a comparative method.  
 
The approach used here is a qualitative case study that relies on the method of 
structured, focused comparison. As pointed out by George and Bennet, the method is 
structured as general questions reflecting the research goals asked of each case studied 
in order to guide and standardize data collection for a systematic comparison (2005). 
According to the authors, “the use of a set of general questions is necessary to ensure 
the acquisition of comparable data in comparative studies” (Ibid: 69). It is, in other 
words, necessary in order to guarantee validity. The method is furthermore focused 
because only certain aspects of the cases are examined, leaving out those that are not 
directly relevant to the analysis (Ibid.).  
 
My intention was to use selective elements to answer the research question. For that 
reason I chose to use the structured, focused comparison approach, because it well 
suited the goal of the investigation. Through comparison of the W park and APT it was 
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my intention to understand the causal conditions that generate a different outcome 
(Ragin 1987; Ragin 1994; Mills 2006). In this specific case the hypothesis already 
gives the PA’s design (our independent variable), as a possible causal condition for a 
different level of conflict around the PAs (our dependent variable).  
1.2.3 Operationalization 
To test the hypothesis in accordance with the method of structured and focused 
comparison, I chose to use the environmental conflict model created by Gleditsch 
(Diehl and Gleditsch 2001):  
 
 
 
This model is composed of a set of causal conditions that escalate the risk of 
environmental conflicts. The model provided the means to apply the method of 
structured, focused comparisons because it has causal conditions that can be analyzed 
in both cases and then compared. Accordingly, I used this set to analyse the W Park 
and the APT in a standardized and systematic fashion, to increase the validity of the 
comparison. As will be illustrated below, population growth and high resource 
consumption per capita; deteriorated environmental conditions; harsher resource 
scarcity; inequality and harsher resource competition are the variables on which I 
focused my research in order to test the hypothesis.  
 
Population growth & high resource consumption per capita 
Deteriorated environmental conditions 
Increasing resource scarcity Inequality 
Harsher resource competition  
Greater risk of conflict 
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As outlined, I chose Gleditsch’s model because it provides a straightforward example 
of the steps leading to an escalation of environmental conflict. In chapter four, the W 
Park and the APT are analyzed and it is shown how the steps of Gleditsch’s model are 
relevant to the conflict escalation around the protected areas. For example, in order to 
create the W Park, some villages were forced to relocate outside the park’s borders. 
This not only created general discontent but also augmented population density in 
some neighbouring districts (which can be connected to the population growth of the 
model). This density augmentation, together with the reduction in available land (now 
partly occupied by the park), increased the competition over the remaining available 
resources (harsher resource competition). Consequently, the remaining land became 
more deeply exploited, resulting in an impoverishment of the soil (deteriorated 
environmental condition). Further, the displaced people lost their rights of access to 
their land (now inside the park), which required them to ask for land exploitation in the 
villages where they resettled.   However, as newcomers, they did not present a strong 
claim to available land.10 Thus they experienced inequity twice over; first through a 
lack of access to their land and then through marginalization in their attempts to access 
new land.  
 
This Malthusian-inspired model has been criticized by many (Godwin 1820; Woolston 
1924; Simon 1996). However, in this thesis I do not enter into the discussion around 
this theory since the model is used as an instrument to guide the analysis as indicated 
by the method of structured, focused comparison. Nonetheless, the choice of using a 
Malthusian model to discuss environmental conflict issues should not leave us 
astonished. In the 1980s discourses on environmental protection shifted their view on 
the major causes for environmental degradation towards poverty. The new strategy of 
ecologists moved towards “sustainable development”. Broch-Due suggested that this 
approach is a replacement of the Malthusian connection between population 
growth/resource scarcity, with a newer connection between population 
poverty/environmental protection (Broch-Due and Schroeder 2000).  
                                                
10 For a more extensive exposition of the relation between AP areas and the Gleditsch’s model see chapters four 
and five.  
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Finally, I do not consider the starting point of Gleditsch’s model (population growth) 
on a global scale, but on a local scale. The population growth is here a consequence of 
population relocation outside the PA’s boundaries. Consequently, the augmentation of 
population density around the PAs is understood as an equivalent to population 
growth.   
 
The use of the structured, focused comparison in conjunction with Gleditsch’s model 
was also of help in overcoming the problem of explanatory variables surpassing the 
features by which a case study can be assessed. Outcomes are the product of multiple 
combinations of circumstances. Accordingly, it is not possible to identify with 
certainty which variables are crucial to influence an outcome (Ragin, 1987). 
Nevertheless, the method of structured, focused comparison was chosen as an attempt 
to reduce this problem. Indeed, it was of help in gathering the existing and pertinent 
data regarding the precondition of the studied outcome. Finally, with the aid of 
Gleditsch’s model, the analysis was structured in the same way for both protected 
areas, in order to address the problem of multiple causations (see also 1.2.5).  
 
1.2.4 Units of analysis 
The units of analysis in this thesis are the W Park located between Burkina Faso, Niger 
and Benin, and the APT between Guinea and Guinea Bissau. Each of them has 
different history, age, and development. However, aware of these challenges, I chose 
to compare them for the following reasons: (1) they share their main goal: the 
protection and durable management of natural resources; (2) the fact that I have first- 
hand knowledge of both places; (3) the countries involved are both former French 
colonies and Sub-Saharan; 11 (4) this African sub-region appears to have more intense 
conflict in connection to nature management (FAO 2003); and finally (5) they share a 
common aim, but could be considered as almost antipodes in their approach.  
 
                                                
11 The only exception is Guinea Bissau, a former Portuguese colony. However, because in Guinea Bissau the 
APT project is still in its very early stage, I have chosen not to include it in the analysis. 
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Performing fieldwork in both PAs gave me the possibility of accessing a number of 
internal documents and reports, of getting relevant primary source materials and, not 
least, of gaining a first-hand impression of the area and its population. An external 
university directed both fieldworks, and my position was that of an independent 
researcher that could have the trust of the different parties. Therefore, during fieldwork 
I was able to talk freely with both conservationists and the local population. This gave 
me the opportunity of getting precious information, difficult to collect otherwise, and 
to see with my own eyes the problems occurring in the two areas.  
 
The countries hosting the W Park and the APT share a similar history, and 
consequently have similar characteristics today (chapter three).  They are among the 
poorest countries in the world and their populations live on a subsistence economy that 
makes them strongly dependent on natural resources (agriculture, fishing, breeding 
livestock, etc). Access to these resources is hence central for the populations’ survival 
and their standard of living. 
 
The two protected areas, while sharing the same goals and purpose, have different 
conceptual premises and design: the “conservationist” model in the W Park, and the 
“community-based” model in the APT. The physical shape of those two protected 
areas is also the results of their different approaches. The W Park has a compact shape, 
since it is a unified block (fig.1), while the APT is formed by a number of small PAs, 
like the islands of an archipelago (fig.2).12 These differences make the study 
interesting and at the same time make the comparison challenging. As mentioned in 
the previous paragraph, to limit pitfalls and to increase construct equivalence, I use 
Gleditsch’s model as a guideline in order to select even elements of comparison.  
 
                                                
12 It has to be noted that the different shape of the parks is not compared. This is because the APT’s shape is the 
outcome of a design process that could have had a different outcome in another area. In other words, with 
different territorial structures and different actors in the negotiation, the shape of the park would be probably 
different. Instead what I analyze here is the process behind the decision of implementing a park with a certain 
shape. 
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1.2.5 Limits and challenges 
This analysis presents several challenges. The first regards the differences between the 
two protected areas. The two cases have for example different time-spans. While the 
W Park is an inheritance of the colonial period, the APT is a rather young project with 
roots in the 1990's. The challenge in this case was two-fold, regarding: a) the different 
documents produced and their availability and, especially b) the differences in the 
length of the two projects’ experience. 
 
The two protected areas’ administration produced a number of field researches and 
reports. Nevertheless, the W Park, due to its longer existence, provides a larger 
number of documents. To deal with this challenge, I tried to select corresponding 
materials from both cases. The documents used for the two case analyses, are mainly 
reports and studies that have been produced with the scope of assisting the two PAs to 
formulate or renovate their Management Plan. Furthermore, especially in the case of 
the APT, I attempted to overcome the occasional lack of information through the use 
of interviews and fieldwork material. Although these sources were collected within a 
different research frame they contributed to gaining a better insight into the field.  
 
The different time-span precluded a comparison based on the actual occurrence of 
conflicts. Through the method of structured, focused comparison I tried to deal with 
the challenges relating to the different time-span, experiences and outcomes reached 
by the two protected areas. Time difference is here two-fold: it means historical time 
since the two PAs are implemented in different decades; but it also regards the 
longevity of the two projects and the data produced in these years. As mentioned 
above, the analysis is focused in the sense that it deals with certain specific aspects of a 
topic. This paper deals specifically with structural characteristics of the two protected 
areas. In other words, I directed my attention towards the principles and theory that lie 
behind the creation and management of the two PAs, as well as towards their process 
of implementation.  Problems related to the creation and implementation of the two 
protected areas refers to their design and the early stage of their implementation. This 
means that this study spotlights the early existence of the W Park and APT, focusing 
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on the potential conflicts that the design itself generates. In this way I sought to reduce 
the problem of time-span difference at least in its second aspect (different length of the 
two projects). 
 
Another important challenge in this study was to meet scientific criteria related to the 
case study approach, such as demands of reliability and validity. Reliability has to do 
with the quality of measurement, and specifically refers to the extent to which the 
same study conducted by a different researcher at another point in time, will achieve 
the same results (Yin 1994). Reliability is always a problem in qualitative research, 
and this thesis is not an exception, as how the actors perceive events can change with 
time.  
 
Validity refers to the relevance of the data in terms of answering the research question. 
In doing research we need to seek: internal validity, which refers to the causal 
relationship of variables; external validity, which deals with the problem of 
generalising the findings to other experiences; and construct validity, concerned with 
the operational measures underlying the study (Yin 1994:33). In doing case studies 
there is the danger of looking for the answers one wants to find, leaving out alternative 
answers in order to strengthen the hypothesis. In this thesis I have tried to search in the 
data for clear links between conflicts and PAs implementation, trying to avoid partial 
deductions. Furthermore, I sought alternative links to those clashes, with the ultimate 
goal of better understanding the situation in the areas. In this way I also aimed to 
enhance internal validity, as according to Yin, looking for alternative explanations can 
serve this purpose (1994:ix).  
 
Another common and legitimate critique is that case studies hold low external validity, 
or low scientific generalization value (Yin 1994). Nevertheless, case studies can 
contribute to theoretical propositions as they enable the combining of different sources 
(reports, interviews, official documents, etc.), in order to investigate one particular 
case and elucidate relevant aspects of the research question (Ibid.). The differentiation 
of sources has also been useful to cross check data; nevertheless, it has been necessary 
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and important to remain conscious of the different origins and purposes of the 
documents consulted and of the data collected. Furthermore, the case study method 
was functional in this thesis because it focuses on what can be learned from a single 
case (Stake 1995). Accordingly, the results of this specific case study can be useful 
material for further development and rearrangement of the theories upon which the 
conservationist and the community-based approaches are based.  
 
Finally, the concepts to operationalise in a piece of research are numerous and 
composite. For example, what we consider to be our unit of analysis? How to 
individuate conflicts in the area? What do we consider to be a conflict? The theoretical 
framework, the method chosen, the model of environmental conflict escalation and the 
multiple sources are the tools I employed to improve construct validity.  
 
1.2.6 Data collection  
 
The data used in this study are mainly of two kinds: 
a) Documents collected during fieldwork, including secondary documents held at the 
projects' offices, and primary data collected through semi-structured interviews. 
These interviews mostly involved the local population and local authorities, but 
also project workers and expatriates; the interviews were also useful to substantiate 
findings and cross check information. These documents were not collected 
specifically for this research.  
b) Other materials, including reports produced by the two projects, mostly in French. I 
accessed these documents at the projects’ offices and through the University of 
L'Aquila, Italy.  
Other materials were collected at the University of Oslo and from Internet sources.13  
 
The vastness of the territories that are the subject of this analysis gives countless 
possible angles of research. However, my fieldwork in the areas made me able only to 
                                                
13 Most of the documents are publicly available, and the private material, results of interviews and field inquiries, 
can be requested from the author.  
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look at some of them and only scratch the surface of a very complex process. 
Nevertheless, I believe that through the material collected in the field and the 
application of the method exposed above, I was able to collect and gather the 
information that contributes to giving a new insight into the influence of protected 
areas design and implementation over the degree of conflict in the areas of interest.  
 
1.3. Structure of the thesis  
The next chapter will introduce the background theories contributing to this analysis 
and will outline how central terms and concepts are understood. 
Chapter three will give an overview on the countries hosting the PAs: Guinea, Burkina 
Faso, Niger and Benin; giving the possibility for better understanding the stakeholders’ 
background.  
Chapter four will be an analysis of the traditional model, applied in the W Park, and of 
the innovative model, employed in the APT Guinea (-Guinea Bissau), in relation to the 
environmental conflict model (Diehl & Gleditsch 2001).  
In chapter five, the findings arising from the analysis chapters will be gathered in order 
to answer the research question. This chapter will be also dedicated to commenting on 
the findings, and to discussing the implications for environmental conservation.  
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2.Theoretical Framework 
 
There are different kinds of protected areas: national parks, nature reserves, biosphere 
reserves, etc. The choice of terminology depends on the conceptions behind the 
protected area management, the level of protection of wilderness, the environmental 
status or sometimes even international trends. The most followed categorization 
system was created by IUCN, which gives standards to categorize protected areas 
according to their management objectives. The categories range from Strict Nature 
Reserve (I) to Managed Resource Protected Area (VI) (IUCN 1994; Phillips 2004). 
However, as pointed out by Kamugisha et al., all of them have as principal goal “the 
protection of natural resources within their boundary”(1997). It is history, tradition, 
and ideology that influence the way this goal is pursued (Ibid.). 
 
The term “protected area” is used here to designate a portion of land dedicated to the 
preservation of nature and managed through legal or other effective means. This 
definition of PAs is extensive, and includes both the conservationist and the 
community-based approaches.  
In the following section the background of both the conservationist and the 
community-based approaches will be outlined in order to understand the logic behind 
their policies.  
 
2.1 The logic of the fortress  
As mentioned previously, the conservationist model has its roots in colonial times. For 
the colonial elites, the preservation of wildlife was a sign of a good advanced society 
(Calandra 1999:3), which encompassed a rational use of the environment. This idea of 
rationality contained in its dichotomy the notion of irrationality. Accordingly, the 
Europeans generally perceived the African traditional use of land as irrational and 
consequently bad. Colonialists considered the local knowledge to be archaic and silly; 
therefore, the sub-Saharans people were not seen as having the skills to properly 
manage nature (Kalahora and Savoye 1986 in Calandra 1999:3). This belief allowed 
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Europeans to impose “their image of Africa upon the reality of the African landscape” 
(Grove and Anderson 1987:4), making Africa an ideal Eden, a “green museum” 
(Calandra 1999:11). In this way colonialists enjoyed international prestige through the 
creation of African parks (Grove and Anderson 1987; Calandra 1999). African lands 
were also exploited through the creation of farms, mines, etc. Nevertheless, large 
portion of territory were given over to protection, which also had the secondary aim of 
creating wood reserves for possible further exploitation (Calandra 1999).  
 
To visibly delimitate the parks’ boundaries, the French colonialists employed the 
common practice of using natural boundaries, for example rivers (Calandra 1999). 
Consequently, the boundaries of many protected areas rooted in the colonial period are 
often the outcome of logistical needs instead of wildlife planning. The W Park also 
followed this logic: the river Niger in the north carries out this function. Therefore, the 
shape of these protected areas is the result of what was practical for European users, 
who saw them as a reserve for potential further exploitations (Calandra 1999; Child 
2004). The creation of protected areas by the French colonialist was three-fold. It 
included an ideological preservation of the wilderness, an economic use of the 
colonies’ resources (wood, game, taxation, etc.) and a political control over the 
population, restricting the freedom of movement (particularly for nomads) and 
settlement (Calandra 1999 and 2001).  Finally, many of these reserves were created 
assuming that the areas were uninhabited, not exploited or used (Himmelfarb 2006; 
Boluvi 2005).  
 
Behind the conservationist approach there is the idea that it is possible to abstract a 
portion of space from the surrounding social context  (Kothari, Lockwood et al. 2006). 
Consequently its physical shape resembles a fortress, comparable to a “medieval 
citadel” that had to be defended from external assaults (Turco 2005:13; Himmelfarb 
2006). Exceptions to this lack of social context are the presence of ecologists to protect 
and research nature, or the monitored presence of humans enjoying the wilderness. 
This kind of PA is then composed of: a core area with no or limited access of 
authorized individuals; a buffer zone where relations between the natural environment 
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and people are allowed within certain limitations; and finally, a transitional area, 
which is understood as the area of influence of the park  (fig.1).14     
 
 
Fig. 1 The conservationist model of nature protection. 
 
2.2 The logic of the community-based model  
The community-based model has its roots in the 1990s, and it is the result of a 
paradigm shift towards a more participatory approach. Various forms of cooperation 
with the local populations have been implemented, for instance community 
development (Hannah 1992), the community approach (Kamugisha, Stahl et al. 1997), 
integrated conservation-development projects (Wells, Hannah et al. 1992), etc. The 
specific approach described here emerged from the human and political geography 
disciplines. This method of nature management takes into consideration a wide 
number of factors connected to the population’s background. The most relevant will be 
recalled in the following part in order to facilitate the understanding of the setting and 
the procedure used to create a community-based protected area based on territorial 
structures. These elements are:  
1. the dichotomy between legal and legitimate power;  
                                                
14 Fig. 1 is an elaboration of the same model from Arbore, C., Leone G., et al. (2005) and Vinciguerra, V. (2005). 
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2. the choice of interlocutors; 
3. the knowledge of territorial structures and 
4. of local competences. 
 
2.2.1 The dichotomy between legality and legitimacy 
Burkina Faso, Niger, Benin and Guinea were all part of the French colonial empire 
(chapter three). The colonial power imported a European political, economic and 
administrative system into the African continent. There were limited investigations of 
existing local organization and power systems, and limited efforts to adapt the colonial 
needs to them. These efforts were limited also because the French approach towards 
the colonies focused on the cultural and administrative assimilation through 
centralization (Blanton et al. 2001 in Bøås & Dokken 2002:122). Centralization meant 
the replacement of traditional authorities by representatives of colonial power and the 
replacement of traditional institutions by bureaucratic institutions belonging to the 
colonial power (Bøås & Dokken 2002:122; Birgegård 1993:30). As a consequence, the 
colonial system weakened and in some cases damaged the local institutions. With 
independence, new elites replaced the colonialist and overruled the groups that were 
not assimilated under the colonial time (Bøås & Dokken 2002:123). This process 
created a dichotomy in the administration system in many African countries, which 
started with the colonies but continued after the independence (Turco 2002a). 
 
Inevitably the organization of power worked (and works), on two levels: the legal one 
created by the colonialist and embraced by the African elites after independence; and a 
legitimate one, operating through traditional power structures (Turco 2002a; 2002b; 
2004). These traditional power systems still exist on different levels in West African 
countries, sometimes they overlap and they have diverse degrees of freedom (Højbjerg 
2007). 
 
For example in Guinea, traditional chiefs have to act carefully, since the traditional 
power system has been strongly persecuted, especially by the post-colonial state and 
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the first leader after independency: Sekou Touré (chapter three). In contrast, in the 
other countries there is a degree of tolerance between the legal and legitimate powers, 
which sometimes permits collaboration. However, the fact that in Guinea the 
traditional power is hidden does not mean that it does not exist. For instance, in most 
of the villages I visited, the use of natural resources is determined by the decision of 
the chief responsible for land, and has nothing to do with the state administration 
system and even less with the concept of private property.15 This chief is the person in 
charge of assigning portions of land to the villagers or to seasonal workers for 
exploitation. He does that, following established routines. For instance in some of the 
areas, when a person seeks work in a village where he does not belong, he need to find 
an autochthon who can vouch for him.  
 
To implement a PA with the community-based approach based on territorial structures 
it is necessary to be aware of, to recognize and master the legitimate system. 
Accordingly, contacts with both the legal and the legitimate systems are required. This 
is because issues discussed only with the state administration can lead to decisions that 
might not be recognized as legitimate by the population, and consequently not be 
respected and become a source of conflicts (Child 2004; Birgergård 1993). 
Conversely, as will be more extensively discussed later, this approach can create 
problems connected to the autochthony issue. As observed by Geschiere in his study 
on protected areas in Cameroon, “greater autonomy for the local communities might 
turn into questions of belonging”; it can be difficult to understand or to agree on who 
is entitled to be part of decision making processes and of resource sharing, and who is 
not (2004:238). This is because local communities are often characterized by what 
Geschiere calls “fission and fusion”, which means that groups are united against 
outsiders, but can come apart when they share resources between themselves 
(2004:240). Issues of autochthony can thus become central when implementing PAs, 
as control over land, management of natural resources and distribution of revenues are 
discussed.  
                                                
15 For the results of this field work in the APT see for example: Arbore, C., Leone G., et al. (2005).   
For the W Park please see: Camara, L. and Vallodoro A. (2003), and Camara, L. (2002).  
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2.2.2 Choice of interlocutors 
The issue introduced above, of legitimacy and legality is strictly connected to the 
choice of the interlocutors. Interlocutor is here understood as a person having a direct 
interest in the negotiations related to the PA and who is representative of a portion of 
population. In other words, the interlocutor is a stakeholder that can legitimately 
represent also the interests of other stakeholders.  
 
According to the method used in the APT, conservationists need to have a dialogue 
with actors who are recognized as representative of the population’s interests in order 
to protect nature with the support and agreement of the local population (Arbore, 
Leone et al. 2005; Turco 2005). Therefore, interlocutors should be sought both within 
the state administration (ministers, bureaucrats, etc.), and within the traditional power 
system (the village chief, the land chief etc.). In Guinea interlocutors were for 
example, (i) village chiefs, heads of associations where women, peasants, young 
people, etc. represent the different users, and (ii) representatives of the administration, 
such as the chief of the Community of Rural Development (CRD), representatives 
from the Ministry of Water and Forestry, etc.16 In this way the different stakeholders 
have their interests represented through spokespersons who are commonly and widely 
accepted (Arbore, Leone et al. 2005; Turco 2005). However, as the analysis in the next 
chapters will highlight, the choice of interlocutors can be highly problematic and even 
be a source of conflict instead of a source of large and pacific representation. For 
example, it can be difficult to understand African rural society, and to recognize 
situations where stakeholders have the intention of excluding other stakeholders. 
Furthermore, it can be difficult to draw a line regarding who belongs to a certain area 
and who does not. For example, it is difficult to find representation for people such as 
the nomads or elites, who emigrate but still maintain strong ties with their village of 
origin. Additionally, it might be questioned whether they should be represented at all, 
since their relations to the village are unclear (chapters four and five). 
                                                
16 The administrative organization in Guinea is: State, CRD, District, Sector, and Village.  
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2.2.3 Territorial Structures 
In order to choose the right interlocutors, a deep knowledge of territorial structures is 
considered essential.17 As with the legality/legitimacy dichotomy, the territorial 
structures in Africa are also overlapping systems. The state administrates the territory 
with divisions such as regions, provinces, and municipalities. However, the African 
population has already transformed the space into territory with specific administrative 
structures, which in most cases survived the acculturation of the colonial period. This 
means for example, that the administration of land is done through a hierarchy where 
newer villages are dependent on the older ones (mother village): 
 
 
 
In most of the villages visited, if a family wants to periodically camp close to their 
fields, an authorization from the village chief is needed. An additional authorization 
will be required if the fields are located within the jurisdiction of another village. 
Additionally, they need the approval of the mother village (the first settlement in the 
area), which has a say in issues regarding the dependent villages. This example shows 
that in order to discuss the future of a specific portion of land, park managers need to 
contact the state administrators and the populations closest to the area but are also 
likely to have to negotiate with the leaders of the mother village(s).18 
 
The following diagram shows the complexity of the overlapping territorial structures 
in a territory. It has to be noted that each corner of the diagram should be understood 
                                                
17 See paragraph 1.2.1 of this thesis for a brief introduction to the term.  
18 The different villages together create a “village network”; classified into three main kinds: classic network, 
eco-functional network and blur network. The focus for the creation of protected areas is given mainly to the 
second type, where relations in the village network are constructed around a natural resource. For an extended 
explanation on “territorial structures” and “village networks” please see: Turco, A. (2005).  
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as plural, since there might be more than one mother village, village, state 
administration, and organization having jurisdiction over the land where the PA lies or 
is intended to lie: 
 
 
 
Issues that are not discussed with the mother village might be considered illegitimate 
by part of the population, which can thus oppose the actions of the conservationists. As 
shown, the situation can be more complicated when large portions of forests are under 
the control of different state administrators, a number of villages and often more than 
one mother village. According to the community-based approach applied in Guinea, 
all these territorial structures have to be identified and taken into consideration in the 
negotiation process in order to create a legitimate protected area.  
 
2.2.4 Local competence 
The last significant aspect to take into consideration in the community-based approach 
is the local traditional competence. As pointed out by different authors (Fairhead and 
Leach 1996; Kamugisha, Stahl et al. 1997; Fairhead and Leach 1998; Calandra 2001; 
Borrini-Feyerabend 2002; Turco 2002a), Africans have developed strategies to 
perpetuate wildlife and guarantee themselves reserves for further exploitation. 
According to the approach applied in Guinea, it is fundamental to bring together 
information gathered from local competence, with the scientific knowledge normally 
used in wildlife protection. For instance, part of the fieldwork carried out in Guinea 
focused on the traditional classifications of soils and agricultural techniques. This 
information was useful to understand the strategies villagers used to maintain the 
productivity of the fields. This enabled conservationists to protect wildlife through re-
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enforcing local competences that were already widely acknowledged, instead of 
introducing from scratch a scientific knowledge often alien to villagers.  
 
The protected area implemented in Guinea is not a unique block like the W Park. 
Instead, it consists of a number of protection “islands”, an archipelago of protected 
areas called Nature Protection Zones (ZMD), or Community Conservation Zones 
(ZCC), depending on their status (paragraph 4.1.2). The APT is the area of interest 
where protectionists have applied the community-based approach described above. 
Fieldwork was carried out within the APT to individuate territorial strictures, choose 
interlocutors and collect information on local competences. After the individuation of 
pivotal areas, protectionists negotiated with villages’ representatives and stakeholders. 
This process, repeated a number of times within the APT, resulted into the 
implementation of various protected areas, which gives the PA the shape of an 
archipelago (fig.2).19 Nonetheless, the shape and the status of community-based PAs 
founded on territorial structures can vary according to field characteristics; 
negotiations with different interlocutors; and obviously the territorial structures. 
Therefore, the PA can assume different forms (also a unique block) and status, in 
accordance to local needs.  
 
                                                
19 Fig. 2 is an elaboration of a similar model from Arbore, C., Leone G., et al. (2005).  
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Fig. 2 An example of community-based protection model 
 
2.3 Summary 
The approaches to create and implement a protected area are composite and reflect a 
number of historical, cultural and scientific criteria. The two PAs analyzed in this 
thesis follow two distinct approaches. The W Park, rooted in the colonial period, 
followed an ideological preservation of wilderness, the economic interests over natural 
resources and political aim of control over the population. The area was addressed to 
protection with a top-down approach, as if it were not inhabited or exploited.  
 
In the APT Guinea the implementation of PAs took into consideration a number of 
peculiarities of West Sub-Saharan society. These are: the dichotomy between legal and 
legitimate power, the choice of interlocutors, the knowledge of territorial structures 
and of local competence. In this way, conservationists aimed to protect nature with the 
consent and conciliation of the local communities.  
 
Park managers, while sharing the same goal of nature preservation, implemented PAs 
through two different approaches. To better understand the peculiarities of these 
approaches and of the societies where they operate, an introduction to the host 
countries is needed. The following chapter tries to serve this purpose. The brief outline 
of the physical geography and the history of Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger and Benin, 
that will follow aim to frame this study and introduce the areas where the PAs 
analyzed are located.  
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3. Guinea and the “W” countries 
3.1 Introduction 
To create and implement a protected area it is necessary to understand the territory, 
from its physical shape to its social configuration. Accordingly, there is a large amount 
of information that it is essential to acquire. This is particularly the case if the design 
method requires deep knowledge of the territorial structures as in the APT. Therefore, 
the conservationists need to collect a great deal of variegate and useful information. 
This chapter gathers some of this essential information, and is two-fold because it (i) 
firstly aims to outline changes in social structures from the pre-colonial era to the 
contemporary periods; and (ii) secondly, it aims to sketch some of the ties between 
these changes and the conservation of the nature.  
 
3.2 A postcard from Sub-Saharan Africa 
Those that have travelled to the area, keep a vivid memory of the long flight over the 
Sahara desert. This ocean of sand seems to never end, nevertheless, at a certain 
moment the pure sand starts to be interrupted by bushes and transforms into savannah. 
As the journey continues, the numerous bushes are replaced by trees and scattered 
forest. The traveller starts to be able to distinguish settlements and even cities. Then, 
according to how far south the flight is heading, the yellow-red pattern of sand 
transforms more and more into scattered green and finally develop into grassland and 
forest. That is how it is flying from North Africa to the Guinean Gulf (fig3).  
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Fig. 3 Sub-Saharan vegetation pattern 
 
In between we find the countries subject of this analysis. From Niger, formed mostly 
by the desert and never reaching the purely green patterns; to Benin, which lies in the 
transition from the scattered forest to a flourishing green landscape.  Niger has indeed 
a subtropical climate, very hot and dry, with a large desert area (Donaint and 
Lancrenon 1984; Zamponi 1994), which leave space only for a difficult agricultural 
exploitation. While Benin, a long stripe of land, has a hot and humid climate with two 
rainy seasons, that make the area more verdant, especially approaching the south 
(Allen, Radu et al. 1989).  
 
Burkina Faso and Guinea are characterized by the same dissymmetry. The former has 
a primarily tropical climate with one rainy season and one dry season and consists of 
extensive plains, low hills, high savannas and desert. The latter is a humid and tropical 
country where some of West Africa’s principal rivers (Gambia, Niger and Senegal), 
rise, making Guinea’s land fertile. With different strength (very high in Niger and 
quite low in Guinea), blows the Harmattan. A dry and dusty wind that between 
November and March covers everything with fine sand particles picked up in the 
desert (Suret-Canale 1970); covering the postcard from Sub-Saharan Africa with 
dominating yellows and reds.   
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3.3 Stepping from the pre-colonial period to the colonial era 
The history of the area and its social organization is so rich that is, to my point of 
view, reductive to call it pre-colonial. However, as the length of this paper does not 
allow a complete overview of how society developed before the arrival of the 
colonialist, I decided to simplify this part and reduce it to information relevant to 
answering the research question.  
 
Guinea belonged partly to medieval Ghana (later the Mali Empire), and partly to the 
Fulani feudal state established in the Fouta Djallon region (O'Toole 2005). Whereas, 
Burkina Faso was dominated by the Mossi’s empire and was an important economical 
area (Zahan 1971). Traces of human presence in Niger go back to about 600,000 years 
ago, and the area was considered an important economic crossroads (Zamponi 1994). 
During recent centuries, the nomadic Tuareg who live mostly in the desert area of the 
country, formed large confederations and clashed with the Fulani Empire. Thus, the 
country was characterized by a variegated organizational system. Finally, before the 
arrival of the colonial powers, Benin was a great medieval African kingdom called 
Dahomey, renowned for its great culture, history and traditions.  
 
Under the power of these kingdoms and empires the population developed their own 
territorial structures, with social hierarchies and organization, problem-solving 
systems, and techniques of nature preservation. European exploration of the area 
began in the mid-15th century when the French, British, and Portuguese competed for 
slaves and for agricultural products (Collins and Burns 2007). In this phase, African 
organization of territory and society met the colonial administration system. At the end 
of the 19th century, the French claimed the area as part of French West Africa (O'Toole 
2005), and eventually those countries became part of the French Colonial Empire (fig. 
4).  
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Fig. 4 French Colonial Empire 
 
In this phase colonial laws and administrative systems were applied in the area, and 
the different territorial structures started to overlap, as a result of different logics 
(colonial/local) operating in the area. As outlined (chapter 2), the colonial power 
imported a new political, economical and administrative system into the African 
continent. Knowledge of the existing local power systems was limited, as were the 
efforts to adapt colonial needs to them. The French approach was to address cultural 
and administrative assimilation through centralization (Blanton et al. 2001 in Bøås & 
Dokken 2002:122). Thus, traditional authorities and traditional institutions were 
replaced by representatives and by bureaucratic institutions belonging to the colonial 
power (Bøås & Dokken 2002:122). Therefore, as stated earlier, the colonial system 
weakened and even damaged some of the local institutions.  
 
This replacement included the introduction of a new concept of nature preservation. 
As pointed out by Himmerlfarb, the colonialist did not consider local users as historic 
managers of the natural resources. Instead they perceived the local population as 
threats to the unspoilt wilderness (2006). Furthermore, Europeans thought that the 
African traditional use of land was archaic and irrational. Colonialist did not recognise 
in the Sub-Saharans the basic skills to properly manage nature (Calandra 1999:3), and 
implemented their own way of protecting nature, through fences (Himmerlfarb 2006). 
Furthermore, the actions of the colonialists were in many cases inspired by 
‘misreading’ the wilderness, as what they often perceived as untouched nature, were in 
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reality highly anthropogenic areas (Fairhead and Leach 1996). Additionally, the 
creation of national parks (the reclassification of African land as colonial land), served 
also to symbolically legitimize the shift of control over land and resources, which took 
place under the colonial conservation law (Himmerlfarb 2006). Thus, stepping from a 
pre-colonial period into the colonial era introduced the two main consequences, which 
concern this study. First, the organization of society developed a dichotomy of 
legal/legitimate territorial structures. Second, the colonialists applied their own 
interpretation, exploitation and organization to the territory, with little or no 
consideration of the existing management systems.  
 
3.4 Next stop: contemporary francophone West Africa  
Burkina Faso, Niger and Benin gained independence in 1960, while Guinea achieved 
its troubled autonomy in 1958 (Collins and Burns 2007), when the union leader Sékou 
Touré made Guinea become the only colony to vote against the constitution of the 
French Community, opting for complete independence (Suret-Canale 1970; O'Toole 
2005; Schmidt 2007). As a result France ended relations, withdrawing financial as well 
as technical aid. In the following period Guinea became a one-party Marxist-socialist 
republic. A political choice followed also in Benin by Kérékou, who first professed 
strict Marxist-Leninist principles (Allen, Radu et al. 1989), then shifted to a 
parliamentary capitalist system (Ibid.). In Guinea, Touré fought any kind of traditional 
power or parallel organization to his regime (Adi and Sherwood 2003; Højbjerg 2007), 
with some exception for  the traditional power of his own people. According to 
Højbjerg, this demystification program was part of a political plan to modify the 
attitude of the population in order to build a new, unified and modern nation-state 
(2007:7). The military regimes’ leaders of the newborn states of Burkina Faso, Niger 
and Benin showed similar attitudes, with different degrees of strength and few 
exceptions. Indeed, the elites of those countries identified the relationship between 
nationalism and traditions as reciprocally exclusive (Ibid:53). Accordingly, in order to 
ensure control, governments often had the direct purpose of undermining traditional 
systems. As stated by Birgegård, efforts to transfer power were made by introducing 
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competing powers such as political organizations and bureaucratic structures, down to 
the village system (1993:30; Bøås & Dokken 2002:122).  In most cases this attitude 
caused traditional leaders to act carefully, hiding from the institutions. During my 
fieldwork in Guinea for example, it was often difficult to distinguish who the 
traditional chiefs were. Sometimes that was difficult because they were themselves 
skeptical about talking openly. Other times, representatives of the administration tried 
to portray themselves as the only authority in the area for obvious reasons of power 
control (Arbore, Leone et al. 2005). This situation complicates the effort of decoding 
overlapping territorial structures inherited from the traditional culture, the colonial 
regimes and the following new independent states.  
 
In the 1990s all four of the countries had their first democratic elections. Nonetheless 
the way to fully-functioning democracies is still seen as long, as demonstrated for 
instance in Guinea in January 2007, when more than hundred people died when 
demanding president Conté to introduce a more transparent government (Vinciguerra 
2007). All four countries perform quite poorly economically and they are all aid 
recipients (Collins and Burns 2007). They all rank poorly in the Human Development 
Index (HDI), with Guinea at position number 160, Benin 163, then Niger number 174, 
and finally Burkina Faso, which scores 176 out of 177 countries.20 Furthermore, a 
rapidly growing population and the resultant competition for natural resources, make it 
difficult for a great deal of the population to fulfil basic needs. Competition over 
natural resources has also escalated into conflict in recent years for example in Niger 
(Moore & SANREM 2005). Accordingly, environmental policy is a delicate topic, 
since it involves also the risk of fuelling existing conflicts.  
 
The management of natural resources did not undergo a great policy shift after gaining 
independence from the colonial power. The new independent states followed the path 
initiated by the colonial protectionists. Himmelfarb points out that early projects of 
nature conservation have strongly influenced today’s practices (2006). He continues 
by elucidating that nature protection models based on the protectionist model, which 
                                                
20 Human Development Index 2007, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ last access on 31.03.2008. 
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can also include forced displacement, are abundantly applied despite the introduction 
of other models, such as for instance community based approaches (Ibid.). 
Protectionist models that rely on the idea of fencing nature off from human activities 
are still largely implemented. Nevertheless, Beinart highlights how lately, efforts have 
been made in order to include livestock breeders and peasants into protected areas 
instead of fully excluding them. However, continues Beinart, “access remains rather 
restricted and conflicts over resources are by no means resolved” yet (Beinart in Grove 
and Anderson 1987:17). What is sometimes different between the former colonies and 
the contemporary states is the recurrent lack of the latters’ resources to invest in 
making those parks work. For instance, it is not always possible for countries such as 
Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger and Benin, to invest large amount of economic resources 
into effectively controlling protected areas’ borders. However, despite this, most of the 
expenditure is devoted to paramilitary guards, law enforcement and public relations, 
with none or little investment towards the local population.  This lack of human and 
economic resources makes these countries often dependent on external donors for the 
implementation of environmental projects (Himmelfarb 2006). And often the 
principles and models on which these protected areas are based, are chosen by the 
donors. As a consequence the multitude of logics applied by the different actors to 
those African countries is growing. It is therefore essential to evaluate which methods 
of design and implementation are more compatible with the reality of those countries. 
The next chapter attempts to do so, by analysing how the design and management of 
the W Park and the APT influence conflict escalation.  
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4. Observing methods of nature protection 
4.1 Introduction 
Nature protection is a growing phenomenon, therefore an understanding of its 
mechanisms and outcomes is needed to avoid pitfalls and improve the effects it has on 
nature and society (Kothari, Lockwood et al. 2006; FAO 2003). This chapter shows an 
effort in this direction; indeed, the W Park and the APT are analyzed to understand the 
strengths and weakness of the two approaches, especially in connection to conflict 
escalation. Accordingly, I will give a brief account of the two PAs’ structures, and I 
will investigate both the W Park and the APT in the light of Gleditsch’s conflict 
escalation model. As the analysis will illustrate in the next paragraphs, both methods 
have been shown to contain some pitfalls and concerns related to their implementation. 
Some of them, briefly anticipated in chapter one, can be recapped thus: in the W Park 
problems seem to be mainly connected to the enforced displacement of the local 
population; and to clashes between two logics (legality/legitimacy), each transforming 
space into territory through different strategies, those of the conservationists and those 
of the local population (Turco 2002b). In the APT challenges are related to the 
difficulties of identifying correctly territorial structures and the interlocutors, with 
consequent risk of fallacy and feeling of inequity (Arbore, Leone et al. 2005).  
 
4.1.1 Introduction to the W Park 
The W Park was initially formed by scattered hunting areas, created for the delight of 
the colonialist (Calandra 1999). The colonial authorities took control over the 
abundant wildlife, and considered the area as virtually uninhabited (Himmelfarb 2006; 
Boluvi, 2005). In 1937 the area officially became the “W National Park” reserve, and 
in the following years the Park went through a number of reinforcing procedures and 
classifications. As of 1952-53, when under the name of “National Forest and Total 
Fauna Reserve of Niger River W”, the park covered about 330,000 hectares. The area 
was not unpopulated as the colonialists previously assumed, on the contrary, evidence 
showed that humans had inhabited the area for thousands of years (Lamarque in 
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Clerici, Bodini, et. al., 2007:30). A number of villages needed to be displaced and 
Moli, the last one, was removed as late as 1954 (D. Dulieu in Boluvi, 2005). A buffer 
zone was introduced in 1984, leading to the incorporation of a greater number of 
villages within the W Park area of influence. The whole complex was then extended to 
1,033,920 hectares; one of the largest transfrontier parks in West Africa designed “to 
control the degradation of natural resources, ensure sustainability and safeguard 
biodiversity” (Clerici, Bodini, et. al., 2007:30; Sherbinin & Freudenberger, 1998).  
 
Recently, Burkina Faso, Niger and Benin joined their effort to manage the area, 
supported by the European Union. As a result, the W Park/ECOPAS Program was 
launched in 2001 to manage a complex called W-Arli-Pendjari ecological complex 
(WAP), which includes the W Park along with a number of other contiguous parks and 
reserves, fig. 5. 21 
 
Fig. 5 W Park and WAP location between Burkina Faso, Niger and Benin. 
 
                                                
21 Fig. 5 is an elaboration of a similar figure of figures taken from: www.parks.it and Journal for Nature, 
Conservation Volume 15, Issue 1, 24 January 2007, p.29. For interactive maps on the W area see: 
http://www.multimap-parcw.org/map.swf 
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4.1.2 Introduction to the APT 
In the last decade the West African countries developed a number of partnership 
initiatives for the environment. One of those aimed to monitor desertification, and in 
the year 2000 a regional program called AGIR was founded.22 Four are the four sub-
programs coordinated by AGIR (Fig. 6):23 
- APT between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau (B1); 
- APT between Guinea and Mali (B2); 
- National Park of Niokolo Koba and National Park of Badiar and their peripheries 
(B3), between Senegal and Guinea; 
- National Park of Haut Niger and its periphery in Guinea (B4).  
 
Fig. 6 AGIR’s sub-programs 
 
The sub-programs are quite different from each other; they have different histories, 
shapes and status as they were created with diverse goals under different previous 
managements. Nonetheless, the general approach introduced by the AGIR program 
focuses on the active participation of the local population and local communities as 
                                                
22 AGIR inherited the remit of another project called PRABV (Programme Régional d’Aménagement des 
Bassins Versants), which from 1989 had the goals of controlling the status of the Niger and Gambia rivers, of 
improving the management of the natural resources as well as the local population’s living conditions (Ghiurghi 
& Pellegrini 2005). 
23 Fig. 6 a rielaboration of a picture from: Vinciguerra, V. (2005). 
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well as the state administration (Ghiurghi & Pellegrini 2005). More specifically, the 
strategies applied by the program are: the preservation of the natural resources through 
direct actions by the local communities; the search for balance between conservation 
and development; the collaboration between the different stakeholders and territorial 
structures; the progressive implementation and acceptance of the protected areas; and 
finally the flexibility to change the strategies if needed (Bonnet 2000:43). 
 
The sub-program analyzed in this thesis is the APT B1 within Guinea and Guinea 
Bissau, which covers an area of 17000 Km². However, as earlier stated, I addressed 
my investigation to AGIR’s actions in Guinea and not in Guinea Bissau, since in the 
latter country the program is in its early stages (Arbore and Vinciguerra 2005), (fig. 
7).24  
 
Fig. 7 The APT B1 Guinea-Guinea Bissau 
 
                                                
24 Fig. 7 is an elaboration of a figure from: Arbore, C., Leone G., et al. (2005).  
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AGIR’s approach to conservation in Guinea is considerably different from the one 
adopted for the creation of the W Park. In Guinea the shape and status of the PA is the 
outcome of integration and negotiations between social, political and ecological 
contexts (Arbore, Leone et al. 2005; Ghiurghi & Pellegrini 2005). To create the PA, 
the program AGIR took into consideration traditional resources, the local management 
as well as the state administration’s requirements (Ibid.). Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that the openness of the program towards collaboration with the local 
communities does not reflect the general conditions in the country. Indeed, Guinea 
despite these recent efforts is still an authoritarian regime, scoring 157 out of 167 in 
the democracy index.25 
 
The APT Guinea is a large portion of land given over to conservation studies. Within 
this area one or more PAs are individuated. Accordingly, the APT Guinea coincides 
with AGIR’s area of influence but not with a specific protected area. Indeed, the APT 
Guinea encloses several PAs: 46 different entities of nature preservation creating a 
network of PAs with different status, sizes and shapes, in accordance to the specific 
needs of the local communities (fig. 8).26 The program grouped all these multiple 
entities into two main types: four Nature Protection Zones (ZMD), and forty-two 
Community Conservation Zones (ZCC).27 The differences between these types will be 
explained below.  
                                                
25 The Economist, available at: http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007_v3.pdf last 
access 3.12.2007 
26 Fig. 8 is a rielaboration based on CARTOLAB’s (laboratoire de cartographie de l’Université de L’Aquila, 
Italie) map in: Ghiurghi, A. and Pellegrini A. (2005).  
27 The orginal names zones de mise en défense (ZMD) and zones de conservation communautaire (ZCC) are 
translated from French by the author. However. I’ll also refer to them as PAs.  
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Fig. 8, ZMD and ZCC in Guinea 
 
 
The implementation of the ZMDs and ZCCs took place through a 5-phase procedure: 
1.contacting the population and identifying the area (information and nature 
awareness); 2. studying of the zone to protect (study of the site, delimitation, sharing 
of information); 3. elaborating a protection plan (definition of activities, creation of a 
local committee, short term management plan); 4. following administrative procedure 
(legal validation of the protected area); 5. creating a management plan with the 
villagers (identification and organization of the actions, elaboration of a calendar, 
execution of the management plan); (Arbore, Leone et al. 2005; Ghiurghi & Pellegrini 
2005).   
 
According to Ghiurghi & Pellegrini’s report, not all the forty-two ZCC have 
implemented all the 5-phases just mentioned (2005). The reason for that is two-fold 
and attributable to: (i) the long time needed to implement all the 5-phases of the 
procedure outlined above; (ii) the fact that the community-based approach 
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implemented in the APT itself implies an openness to changes and the evolution of 
each of the ZCCs. They can shift size and status according to the changing needs of 
the communities and as such are projects in continual evolution. 
 
The difference between ZMDs and ZCCs relates to the fact that ZMDs are small, they 
do not provide different levels of protection within their boundaries (for instance core 
and buffer zones), and they belong to a single village (Arbore, Leone et al. 2005; 
Ghiurghi & Pellegrini 2005). Accordingly, as pointed out by Turco (2005), the ZMDs 
answer the need of protecting very specific ecosystems. 
 
While the ZMDs belong only to one village, the ZCCs occupy a territory belonging to 
more than one village, as they are located within a network of villages. Therefore, the 
implementation of a ZCC is more composite. However, in both cases, once the 
territorial structures are clear, it is possible to identify the interlocutors within the legal 
and legitimate spheres, and investigate the local strategies of resource preservation. In 
this way park managers are able to interact with stakeholders historically and 
culturally connected to the area, that can represent the interests of its inhabitants. As 
the analysis highlighted, this can be a weak point, because different people can have 
different interests over the ZCCs and ZMDs, and might promote a misreading of the 
territory to their own advantage. While others might have an interest in excluding 
some interlocutors that in reality have a central role for the legitimate existence of the 
area (see paragraph 4.5.2).  
 
The management and control of a ZMD or a ZCC is shared between a local 
management committee (with villagers from the legal as well as the legitimate sphere), 
and the forest guards provided by the state administration (Arbore, Leone et al. 2005; 
Ghiurghi & Pellegrini 2005). To strengthen the communities’ capacity to manage the 
natural resources, small councils have also been established with the role of organizing 
environmental awareness campaigns, and of being the reference point for local and 
external exploiters as well as the administration (Ghiurghi & Pellegrini 2005). 
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However, issues of belonging might make it hard for some actors to have a voice in 
those councils (paragraph 4.5.2).  
 
Both the approaches implemented in the W Park and the APT have strengths and 
downsides. The next paragraphs show the analysis of the two PAs in the light of 
Gleditsch’s model, to highlight which aspects of the design and implementation 
influence the conflict escalation.  
 
4.2 ”Population growth & high resource consumption per capita” 
4.1.1 Population growth & high resource consumption per capita in the W Park 
 
Around the W Park there are approximately 405,000 inhabitants distributed unevenly 
among 1,019 villages, hamlets and camps (Boulovi 2005). People formerly living 
inside the park that were forced to move out form a good deal of this population. 
Indeed, the population density augmented noticeably outside the park’s limits as the 
largest part of the displaced population did not move far away, but stayed in its 
proximity, in order to maintain cultural, economic and emotional attachment to their 
land (Camara 2002; Burini & Ghisalberti 2003; Camara & Vallodoro 2003; Turco 
2004; Boulovi 2005).28 This phenomenon does not indicate a population growth strictu 
sensu, but an augmentation of population density. According to Diehl and Gleditsch, 
population density is also an indicator of population pressure over resources (Diehl 
and Gleditsch 2001), because population size and consumption patterns are recognised 
as correlates with resource demand (Kothari, Lockwood et al. 2006). 
 
The increased population density around the park’s boundaries created an 
augmentation of consumption. Consequently, more land is needed by the villagers to 
meet the increased need of goods and to increase production. As pointed out by an old 
man interviewed by Camara & Vallodoro:  
 
                                                
28 For an example of the consequences of displacement and resettlement see the eco-functional network of 
Kérémou-Gbéniki-Soroko after the displacement of Tobey, in : Burini, F. and Ghisalberti A. (2003).  
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“... Our situation reminds that of fishes in a dry river. Everybody aims at the few 
humid part of land”, (Camara & Vallodoro 2003). 29 
 
The old man meant that the demographic augmentation led to increased need for 
goods, for land (for cultivation and livestock), and for exploitable resources. Thus, it 
introduced a high degree of competition over the natural resources (Camara & 
Vallodoro 2003).   
 
Field reports indicate other indirect effects of displacement. For example, the 
introduction and intensification of clashes between different social categories 
(peasants/livestock farmers, for example), and between the local population and the 
authorities implementing the displacement (Toutain, Compaoré et al. 2001; Camara 
2002; Burini & Ghisalberti 2003; Camara & Vallodoro 2003). The first type of clashes 
is mostly due to the new arrangements needed to ensure livelihood of the increased 
population living around the park. Peasant and farmers, for example, need to find new 
ways to cohabit in a smaller area that offers fewer resources. While the clashes directly 
connected to displacement reflect the natural reaction of people who are not willing to 
leave the place where they traditionally lived.  
 
To avoid external interferences in the PA, park managers implemented displacement. 
But such interferences can be also temporary and caused for example by shepherds 
with their cattle. To avoid such intrusions, W Park’s administrators forbade the use of 
paths to the nomadic shepherds and herdsmen (Boulovi 2005). Shepherds in the area 
commonly used this practice to seasonally move their animals in search of pasture. 
Therefore, the closing of these traditional paths limited their opportunity to bring the 
cattle to better pastures. One of the consequences experienced in the area was the 
increase of permanent and temporary camps of herdsmen in the proximity of villages. 
This phenomenon caused a further increase of population density, intensifying 
competition over the use of natural resources in the park’s proximity (Boulovi 2005). 
                                                
29 Translated by the author from:  « ...notre situation se ressemble à celle des poissons dans une rivière asséchée. 
Tout le monde désire les rares parties humides du terrain ».  
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While other shepherds decide to ignore the prohibition, creating obvious clashes 
(4.4.1). 
4.2.2 Population growth & high resource consumption per capita in the APT 
In the APT Guinea each ZCC and ZND is negotiated with the local villagers, more 
precisely, with those belonging to the villages’ network (or networks), that has control 
over the area. In this way, the interlocutors identified are meant to be representative of 
both the population and the administration. They negotiate and finally decide whether 
a portion of land should be allocated to environmental protection. The local 
communities, through spokespersons then decide, with the assistance of AGIR, where 
exactly the ZCC or ZMD will be located, its size, its boundaries, etc. Due to the 
reduced size of these PAs and the participatory negotiation, it is unlikely that villagers 
need to be displaced (Arbore, Leone et al. 2005). Subsequently, these issues should be 
normally solved before the implementation of the ZCCs or ZMDs. 
 
The nature protection in the APT is highly fragmented (46 areas), and the size of the 
ZMDs and ZCCs does not often exceed 10.000 hectares (Ghiurghi & Pellegrini 2005). 
This means that for the shepherds, the creation of these PAs does not represent a threat 
as they can easily work their way around the PA with their cattle.  
 
Finally, the density in the area where AGIR operates is relatively low: 13,77 hab./km², 
and 30,9 hab./km² in the rest of the country (Arbore, Leone et al. 2005; Ghiurghi & 
Pellegrini 2005). In some areas the density grows seasonally, since some peasants 
move periodically to find better conditions for their cultivations (Arbore, Leone et al. 
2005). In the same way, density changes when the shepherds move to the seasonal 
pastures (Ibid.). In these situations there is an augmentation in the use of the available 
resources, however this phenomenon is not attributable to the introduction of the 
ZMDs and ZCCs. Beside these seasonal augmentations, the rural areas generally lose 
inhabitants because there is a tendency towards urbanization (Ibid.). Nonetheless, it 
can be said that there is no correlation between the creation of PAs and the first step of 
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Gleditsch’s model in the area analyzed in Guinea. This is because the introduction of 
ZCCs or ZMDs does not play any role in the shifting of density mentioned above.   
4.3 ”Deteriorated environmental condition” 
4.3.1 Deteriorated environmental condition in the W Park 
Displacement and density augmentation also influenced the environmental conditions 
of the area in the proximity of the W Park. As observed by the field researchers 
(Camara 2002; Camara & Vallodoro 2003), and by park observers (Boulovi 2005), the 
extent of cash-crop agriculture around the W Park enlarged noticeably. Moreover, the 
lack of available cultivable land forced the peasants to intensify the use of the soil, as 
the same amount of available land has to satisfy a larger population. In these 
conditions it is very difficult for peasants to apply a rotation which will leave the fields 
fallow. Fallowing is the practice of leaving a field for at least one year without a crop 
in order for it to recover its natural fertility. This practice is especially used in areas 
where farmers cannot afford fertilizer. In poor lands, as those around the W Park, the 
fields need this “rest” for up to even ten years before they can be successfully 
cultivated again. When the pressure on land is very high, peasants tend to shorten the 
period of fallow. The result in the long run, is that the soil becomes increasingly 
impoverished. 
 
The increased pressure on land thus causes a reduced fertility of the soil (Camara & 
Vallodoro 2003; Boulovi 2005). Sherebinin and Freudenberg go even further by 
pointing out that governments’ transmigration schemes resulted in a remarkable 
increase in population density, causing malnutrition (Sherbinin & Freudenberger 
1998:45). The authors go as far as to state that the W Park administration makes the 
population lose supplies, and controversially, favours primates instead (Ibid.).   
 
Nevertheless, without going that far, it can be stated that the general environmental 
conditions of the area suffer increased exploitation due to the augmentation of 
population density, as well as the lack of access to fresh land.  
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4.3.2 Deteriorated environmental condition in the APT 
The field researchers in Guinea reported signs of environmental degradation in the 
area (Arbore, Leone et al. 2005). The cause for this deterioration seems to be the tilling 
of new portions of land. According to Arbore, Leone et al., farmers in Guinea are used 
to having a great availability of land, as one of the outcome of the low population 
density in the area is the high availability of cultivable territory per capita (2005). In 
other West African countries (as in those hosting the W Park) the amount of accessible 
land and the productivity of the fields are normally quite low. These difficult 
circumstances encouraged the improvement of agrarian techniques and the ability of 
safeguarding the fields’ productivity (Camara & Vallodoro 2003).  In the area where 
AGIR operates, the peasants never had great problems with the availability of land. 
Accordingly, they developed fewer systems to ensure the endurance of their fields’ 
productivity (Arbore, Leone et al. 2005). Guinean farmers employ systems of crop 
rotation and fallow as in other West African countries. However, the tendency in this 
part of Guinea is to till new portions of land while the fields lie fallow (Ibid.). In this 
way new portions of forest and savannah are regularly transformed into farmland for 
new cultivations. In addition, this phenomenon accelerated in recent years, due to the 
introduction of cash crops cultivations into the area, as for example the cashew (Ibid.).  
 
The practise of transforming forest and savannah into cultivated fields increases the 
deterioration of the environmental condition in the area, creating challenges for the 
survival of wildlife (Arbore, Leone et al. 2005). Nevertheless, in this context, the 
introduction of ZMDs and ZCCs does not seem to be the variable that causes the 
deterioration of environment. On the contrary, here nature protection seems to be the 
means to protect portion of land from this practise.    
 
4.4 ”Increasing resource scarcity” 
4.4.1 Increasing resource scarcity in the W park 
As portrayed in chapter 3, the W Park is located where the savannah grassland 
transforms into forest-woodland savannah. It would be wrong of us to imagine some 
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sort of verdant jungle. Nevertheless, even if the area is not as luxuriant as the 
appellation “park” can make us think, livestock is still abundant. The resources 
enclosed in the W Park are protected from external interferences; therefore they are 
not available to the population. For this reason “resource scarcity” is understood as the 
shortage of available resources to the population that lives in the proximity of the W 
Park, and not as scarcity in absolute terms. Therefore, this paragraph deals with the 
peripheries of the W Park. 
 
In the previous section I introduced the problem of overexploitation of land. The main 
consequence of this problem is the impoverishment of the soil, which provides lower 
quantity and quality of products. In addition, the increased extent of cash-crops 
cultivations tends to further impoverish the fields. Numerous villages registered 
decreasing livestock available to the population. This problem especially involves 
livestock farmers and shepherds. As noted by Camara & Vallodoro, peasants need to 
enlarge the portion of cultivated land, leaving portions too small for pasture. This 
phenomenon adds problems to the shepherds who have already lost access to their 
normal pasture paths within the W Park. One of the few alternatives for livestock 
famers and shepherds, is to break the law and take the risk of entering the park 
(Sherbinin & Freudenberger 1998; Burini & Ghisalberti 2003; Camara & Vallodoro 
2003).30 Aware of the difficulties for the shepherds, the W Park’s managers introduced 
new, less intrusive paths for the animals. However, these new routes are excessively 
long and the animals are often not able to survive the long journey (Convers 2002). 
Predictably, a large number of livestock are brought into the park in order to survive 
(Toutain, Compaoré et al. 2001).  
 
Bringing the herd into the park is a risky business. If the forest guards find livestock 
within the W Park’s boundaries, they can give a fine to the cattle’s owner, they can 
confiscate the animals for a period, or they can kill the herd or a part of it (an option 
which applies mostly in Benin), (Toutain, Compaoré et al. 2001; Convers 2002).  
                                                
30 The field researchers have, among other places, registered this phenomenon in Kondjo, Mourekouara, 
Kiwirkoye, Bossia, etc. Burini, F. and Ghisalberti A. (2003).  
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Accordingly, going into the PA is not a careless decision taken by the shepherds. It is 
instead the result of unresolved conflicts between the peasants and the park’s 
administration. But it is above all the result of the lack of resources, which are not 
enough to satisfy the needs of all the different stakeholders now sharing the park’s 
proximity.  
 
4..4.2 Increasing resource scarcity in the APT 
This aspect of Gleditsch’s model is observed only in a few reports regarding the APT 
Guinea. Arbore et al. show that resource scarcity in the area relates to essentially 
fishing, hunting and livestock (Arbore, Leone et al. 2005). In the first two cases, 
fishing and hunting, the decrease of available resources is determined by 
overexploitation (Ibid.). According to the villagers interviewed, over-fishing and over-
hunting are consequences of the exploitation carried out by seasonal fishermen and 
hunters (Arbore, Leone et al. 2005). The locals claim that the resources are enough for 
their living, but they became scarce when seasonal workers exploit the area, especially 
if they do it commercially. This situation creates the menace of conflicts between 
residents and foreign exploiters. In the case of livestock, the problem is connected to 
the peasants’ practise of burning grass in order to till new fields. This issue is linked to 
that mentioned earlier (4.3.2): peasants extending their fields instead of implementing 
new techniques of cultivations. This practise reduces the area available for pasture, 
creating difficulties for the livestock farmers.   
 
There is no causal relationship between the creation of ZMDs and ZCCs and this 
aspect of the environmental conflict escalation model, as the introduction of PAs does 
not increase the arrival of seasonal exploiters. On the other hand, it could be stated that 
the introduction of PAs might reduce the territory to be shared between livestock 
farmers and peasant. Nevertheless, no observation in this regard was reported in the 
document analyzed. In addition, PAs could be used as instrument to regulate the 
exploitation of the area. Locals aim to force seasonal workers to follow the rules 
introduced by the residents in collaboration with the state and park managers. The 
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same concept applies to the peasants/farmers quarrel: through protecting portions of 
land and regulating their exploitation, users could guarantee space for their own 
activities.  
 
4.5 ”Inequity” 
4.1.1 Inequity in the W Park 
This step of Gleditsch’s resource escalation model is one of the most composite of this 
investigation. To facilitate the analysis, I attempted to group the various aspects of 
inequity in the W Park, as the following: (i) loss of status and (ii) uneven access rights.   
 
Loss of status 
Once more the starting point is the displacement of the population outside the park. 
Villagers that have been displaced are subjected to a number of losses.  
 
First of all they lose their land; with all the traditions, memories and goods connected 
to it. Then, after they resettle in another area, they have to deal with the defeat of their 
authority and power. Those that were recognised as chiefs, with power of giving 
authorization for land use, are now left with nothing.31 They themselves have to 
request land use from other leaders, and so have to do all the displaced people when 
resettling elsewhere. Furthermore, as they are the last to arrive, they are given the least 
rights (Camara 2002; Camara & Vallodoro 2003).  
 
The displacement has also consequences for women’s status. They no longer have the 
rights of using the park’s area for their harvest. It is a loss because with what they got 
from this activity they could normally support themselves. As a consequence, they lose 
the extra income they used to have and their little economic freedom (Camara 2002).  
 
                                                
31 In many areas of West Africa, the use of land is not ruled by private property. Often villages have a “land 
chief” who gives temporary concession to exploit portions of land that are under the village control. Frequently, 
the land chief is a different person to the village chief, but sometimes they can overlap.  
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Finally, the nomadic herdsmen also experience a loss of status and identity. In many 
cases, the closing of traditional paths in the park or the extreme length of the new ones 
makes some nomads decide to settle. For them it is an extreme step, which also has 
great influence on the organization of the society. This is especially true for those 
groups for whom the cattle have great importance and social meanings, such as the 
Fulani (Camara & Vallodoro 2003).  
 
The post displacement period is therefore highly stressful experience for both the 
displaced people and their receivers. Indeed, displacement forces the villages to deal 
with the fragmentation of their own organizational structures. The displaced villages 
disappear, and communities become jeopardized; while receiving villages are 
challenged by reorganising life to include the newcomers. Furthermore, the sentiment 
of expropriation is thus two-fold: (i) the population sees their land, their village, their 
goods, materially going under the state control; and (ii) they feel symbolically 
expropriated of their rights and their traditional power system (Turco 2004). 
 
Uneven access to rights 
Another problem concerns the right to access the PA (Camara 2002; Burini & 
Ghisalberti 2003; Camara & Vallodoro 2003). Tourism is one of the revenues of the W 
Park, as tourists visit the PA to observe wildlife and to have the possibility of hunting 
in game reserves (Boulovi 2005). To do so, they need an authorization and often need 
to pay for their stay, for their rights to hunt, and for the potential catch.  
 
Local people hold no or limited rights to exploit the park, in which many lived before. 
Instead, foreigners can do so by paying to access the park and its natural resources. 
Money becomes the means of gaining rights to exploitation. In this way, villagers 
perceive that game is denied to local hunters, while being accessible to foreigners. In 
addition, the revenues of these tourist activities are not going to them but mostly to the 
state (Turco 2004).32 
                                                
32 To avoid problems related to this aspect the park created the ZOVICs which are hunting areas managed by the 
local population. However, this experiment seems not yet fully successful. For more information please see page 
20 in Boulovi, G. M. (2005).  
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This problem is not only relevant in its merely material aspect. It has instead a highly 
symbolic significance for the society. The forest is often the place hosting the ancient 
spirits, who give, among other things, the right to exploit land. When displaced, the 
population has to leave the sacred areas where the ancestors live and they cannot 
access them anymore. Already traumatic, displacement becomes unbearable when 
strangers can access and even camp in these sacred areas, while the local communities 
cannot perform their traditional rituals (Burini & Ghisalberti 2003; Camara & 
Vallodoro 2003).  
 
This aspect is particularly relevant as the population feel inequity and injustice in the 
way they are treated by park managers. Situations such as the ones exposed above 
were observed in several areas around the W Park. Those problems connected to 
uneven rights to access the park have been recorded as relevant to potential or ongoing 
conflicts in the area (Camara & Vallodoro 2003).33 
4.5.2 Inequity in the APT 
Most of the concerns regarding the PAs in the APT Guinea are linked to this category 
of Gleditsch’s model. Inequity has been reported in relation to the participation of 
interlocutors in the negotiations, and the employment of territorial structures (Arbore, 
Leone et al. 2005). More precisely, it is possible to categorize the inequity issues 
observed in the APT, into four main groups: 
1. villages trying to be recognised as part of a village network, in order to gain control 
over a PA and share potential revenues; 
2. villages trying to leave out other villages in order to gain more control over the PA 
and the potential revenues connected to it.  
3. negotiations in which relevant interlocutors have been left out; 
4. negotiation in which irrelevant interlocutors have been involved. 
 
                                                
33 There are a large number of villages recording this problem. However, an exhaustive example can be given by 
the situation in Karey Kopto. For further information on this case, please see Camara, L. and Vallodoro A. 
(2003). 
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These issues are all related to the work preceding the implementation of the PA. As 
previously outlined, the creation of ZMDs and ZCCs is based on the capacity of 
recognising the dichotomy legality/legitimacy; of identifying relevant and 
representative interlocutors; of individuating the territorial structures and of being 
aware of the local competence (paragraph 2.2). The sense of inequity perceived by the 
population appears when one or more of those steps fails to reach their objective. The 
failure might be caused by the inability to understand local social constructions. Some 
may not succeed in recognizing the relevant territorial structures due to carelessness, 
superficiality, or failure to read the African society. However, the reason might also be 
connected to a misleading perpetrated by villagers who have hidden agendas (Arbore, 
Leone et al. 2005).  
 
A concrete example was reported in a village called Dikola (Arbore, Leone et al. 
2005). The village’s chief criticized the AGIR project because it did not include his 
village among those having control over a ZCC. A deeper field research project 
followed in order to restore equality within the villages. The research highlighted that 
the village was not part of the network controlling the PA. Thus, it had no legitimate 
power over the ZCC. The village’s chief was giving fallacious information to 
introduce a misleading view of the territory. His goal was to gain control over the ZCC 
and a share of the possible revenues connected to it (Ibid.).  
 
Similar cases have been registered in other areas of the APT, complicated by ethnic 
issues and shifting of control over land. In a ZCC called Kakiire, for example, the 
main interlocutors involved by AGIR were from a Nalou group that had exploited the 
area for years (Arbore, Leone et al. 2005). The negotiations to create a PA began with 
the Nalou group and had a positive outcome. At this point a group of Balanta contested 
this process, affirming that the area belonged to them. Follow-up enquiries reported 
that the area belonged to the Balanta but was given to the Nalou for exploitation many 
years before. In this case the situation became quite critical, as it was difficult for 
AGIR to give priority to one of those group, for they both showed legitimate claims 
over the territory.  
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These two examples were reported here to show how the inequity issue has been 
perceived in the area as the most conflict prone aspect of Gleditsch’s model. The 
villagers that are left outside the negotiations might feel a sense of injustice, which can 
shift into resentment towards the project and towards other villages. In addition, in 
areas where the rights over land are not clear, it can be difficult to achieve win-win 
negotiations, as one of the parties can feel overruled.  
 
In addition, issues of belonging can complicate perceptions of inequity. Geschiere 
emphasises how struggles regarding who really belongs to a certain village/area, arise 
when local communities are promoted as stakeholders in nature preservation projects 
(2004: 238 and 240). According to the author, environmental projects that “promote 
poorly defined local communities as stakeholders may activate or reactivate forms of 
social exclusion”, in some cases going as far as episodes of xenophobia (Ibid.:252). In 
this specific case these risks are all at stake. The method applied in the APT relies on a 
deep understanding of the local context. However, it might be difficult for example to 
decide if, how, and where nomads should be represented. The same problem arises for 
people who originally belonged to a certain village but, while maintaining strong ties 
to it, have moved elsewhere; or for newcomers to a certain place, or for those arriving 
after the negotiations or the creation of the PAs. Thus, issues of belonging can become 
central in Pas’ implementation, because control over land, management of natural 
resources and distribution of revenues are negotiated through patterns of belonging.  
 
Finally, even the very method applied in the APT Guinea might strengthen inequality 
in the long run because it gives great attention to the traditional power structures. As 
shown, these are important to implementing negotiations where all the stakeholders 
feel represented. However, by doing so, this approach could help reinforce certain 
power structures that are well respected but are not always very democratic in West 
sub-Saharan Africa.  
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4.6 ”Harsher resource competition” 
4.6.1 Harsher resource competition in the W Park 
In the first part of this chapter I described how the displacement of villages, and the 
general limitation of access to the PA, led to an augmentation of pressure on the land. 
Consequently, the same resources have to satisfy the needs of a larger number of 
individuals with the resultant augmentation of competition over the access, use and 
control of the natural resources.  
 
This paragraph focuses on three of the direct effects of increased competition over the 
resources around the W Park.  
 
The first aspect regards clashes between different working categories 
(peasant/livestock, farmer/shepherd for example). Between these, there is a rise in 
tension due to the different ways of understanding the territory and its use. Indeed, 
each of these groups plans to address the natural resources in a specific way (cultivated 
fields, pasture, etc.), and clashes occur when the priorities are different. In the same 
way, villagers feel resentment towards the park’s administration, for putting the area to 
a different use which excludes them (Toutain, Compaoré et al. 2001; Camara 2002; 
Convers 2002; Turco 2002b; Burini & Ghisalberti 2003; Camara & Vallodoro 2003; 
Turco 2004).  
 
The second consequence of resource competition has direct influence on the park’s 
endurance. To loosen up the tensions between different working categories, some 
villagers extend their cultivations or pasture inside the W’s boundaries (Toutain, 
Compaoré et al. 2001; Convers 2002; Burini & Ghisalberti 2003). Indeed, resource 
scarcity and increased competition can induce the villagers to not respect the PA’s 
rules, and exploit the resources in the park. In this way they increase the portion of 
resources per-capita, decreasing the level of competition within the different 
stakeholders. However, by invading portions of the park, they enter into direct 
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competition with wildlife for natural resources (Boulovi 2005), and increase the 
tension with the W’s administrators and forest guards.  
 
The last aspect discussed here is the further displacement of people. Some families 
hold strong rights over land, assuring their own endurance (Burini & Ghisalberti 
2003). Conversely, most people, especially those who resettle after displacement, do 
not have consolidated rights over land. Often, the only solution for these people is to 
go through further displacement. This can be of two kinds: some families decide to 
find a new place to stay (often abroad), hoping to find better opportunities (Burini & 
Ghisalberti 2003); but in most cases it is the young men who leave the villages for 
seasonal or temporary jobs. They are often directed towards places where they can 
work in plantations. Otherwise they go abroad, often to Nigeria, to work with trade 
(Burini & Ghisalberti 2003). This is evidently a problematic issue, as people 
experience further displacement, and especially because the young and strongest 
workers leave, creating unbalanced and dysfunctional societies.  
 
4.6.2 Harsher resource competition in the APT 
According to the document accessed, within the APT the competition to access the 
natural resources is limited (Arbore, Leone et al. 2005; Ghiurghi & Pellegrini 2005; 
Turco 2005). In normal conditions, the low density that characterizes the area gives 
ample space of action for the different exploiters. Obviously, there might be issues of 
equality in accessing the best fields or bigger portions of land; as the traditional 
systems to assign cultivable land are mostly respected but not always particularly 
democratic or fair. Nevertheless, most problems occur between local and seasonal 
exploiters. Augmented competition over the natural resources has been also recorded 
in connection to cash crop cultivations. In the areas where this practise is increasing, 
there is indeed a large need for fields for long term exploitation (Arbore, Leone et al. 
2005), increasing competition to access more land. Nevertheless, these issues are not 
directly related with the introduction and the implementation of PAs within the APT. 
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However, it is important to be aware of them, to know which are the tensions in the 
area.  
 
What connects the introduction of both ZCCs and ZMDs to this step of the model is 
the interest to share control over them. As introduced in the paragraph analysing 
inequity, some villages struggle to be included among those sharing the control over a 
ZCC or a ZMD (Arbore, Leone et al. 2005). They do so hoping to share also possible 
advantages or revenue occurring in connection to the PAs. These competitions 
normally take place in a serene way through attempts to claim traditional ties to the 
land (Ibid.). However, some of these quarrels are less peaceful, involving ethnic issues 
or struggles for power control (Ibid.). AGIR has only one tool to deal with those 
issues. This is to prevent inequality, and to avoid a misreading of the territorial 
structures. This is a very central point for the success of this community-based 
approach to nature preservation; because a failure or a mistake in individuating 
interlocutors or territorial structures can increase feeling of inequity and competition 
over resources.  
 
4.7 ”Greater risk of violence” 
4.7.1 Introduction 
In the previous paragraphs, I analyzed the W Park and the APT Guinea in relation to 
population growth and resource consumption, deteriorated environmental condition, 
increasing resource scarcity, inequity and finally, harsher competition for resources. 
Each of these steps highlighted the main problematic outcomes of the two PAs’ 
structure and implementation. This paragraph goes a step further to see which of these 
outcomes result in a greater risk of conflict. 
 
In the following chart a parallel is shown between Gleditsch’s model’s steps and the 
situation in the W Park and the APT Guinea: 
 
Table 1. Conflict escalation in the W Park and the APT Guinea 
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CONFLICT 
ESCALATION STEPS 
SITUATION IN THE W PARK SITUATION IN THE APT 
 
Population Growth &High 
Resource Consumption Per 
Capita 
 
 High population density 
 Augmentation of consumption 
 Intensification of use of soil 
 
 Low population density 
 Use of extended fields per capita 
 
Deteriorated Environmental 
Conditions 
 
 Impoverishments of soil  Impoverishments of soil (not due 
to the APT introduction) 
 
Increasing Resources Scarcity 
 
 Decrease of livestock available per 
capita 
 Illegal exploitation of the PA 
 Seasonal overexploitation  (not due 
to the APT introduction) 
 
Inequity 
 Loss of status- degeneration of social 
structures 
 Uneven access to PA- resentment and 
conflict 
 Competition to control the PAs 
 Risk of involving wrong 
interlocutors- issues of belonging, 
resentment and conflict  
 Risk of misreading the territorial 
structures  
 
Harsher Resources 
Competition 
 Tension between stakeholders 
 Illegal exploitation of the PA  
 Further displacement - degeneration 
of social structures 
 Tension between villagers 
 
The chart gives an overview of the thorny issues connected to the implementation of 
the PAs (highlighted in grey). These challenging issues are, according to the model of 
environmental conflict escalation, the ones that might generate conflicts.  
 
4.7.2 Greater risk of violence in the W Park 
According to the data analyzed, existing or potential conflicts around the W Park are 
of two main kinds: (A) conflict between different categories of the local population as 
peasant, livestock breeders, shepherds, etc.; and (B) conflicts between the local 
population and the Park’s administration and the state (Toutain, Compaoré et al. 2001; 
Camara 2002; Burini & Ghisalberti 2003; Camara & Vallodoro 2003), (fig 9). 34 
                                                
34 Fig. 11 is an elaboration of the same figure used in Turco 2004.  
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Fig. 9 Types of conflicts connected to the W Park 
 
In the first group (A) fall the clashes between peasants and livestock farmers (both 
sedentary and nomads) localised in fig. 8 with “breeding”. These conflicts are due to 
the strong competition over the use of natural resources and are three-fold. Clashes 
take place between (i) peasants and livestock farmers, as mentioned; between (ii) 
locals and those newly arrived (displaced people or nomads with their cattle); and 
between (iii) sedentary livestock farmers and nomads (Camara & Vallodoro 2003).  
 
Additionally, work categories are often traditionally connected to the ethnic origins of 
the villagers. For example, shepherds are often Fulani, while peasants are often 
Gourmance. This means that conflicts between work categories might also take the 
form of ethnic clashes. Around the W Park, conflicts within the population took place 
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sometimes as punitive expeditions.35 Violent episodes have also been registered during 
the passage of nomad herdsmen, since they can lose control of their animals and 
invade cultivated areas (Camara & Vallodoro 2003). As pointed out by Camara & 
Vallodoro, these episodes are increasingly common because, to overcome the lack of 
land and the increased demands of livestock, the peasants move their fields ever closer 
towards the paths used by the nomads with their cattle. In this situation clashes are 
likely to happen and can be quite aggressive (Ibid.).  
 
The second category of conflict (B) involves the local population and the institutions. 
As highlighted in the previous paragraphs, this type of conflicts is rooted in:  
 the restrictions on the population to enter the park without previous negotiations;  
 the displacement of entire villages (fig. 9);  
 the closing of paths for the seasonal shepherds;  
 the closing of the area to local hunters (fig. 9);  
 the management of the revenue;  
 the opening to tourists, etc.  
 
The local population does not have much means to oppose the park managers’ actions.  
The main outcome of this clash is the general indisposition of the population towards 
the park’s actions and the disregard for the park’s regulations. Villagers often 
penetrate the PA to accomplish interdicted activities such as hunting, grazing, 
harvesting and even cultivating (Brown 1992; Toutain, Compaoré et al. 2001; Camara 
2002; Convers 2002; Burini & Ghisalberti 2003; Camara & Vallodoro 2003). These 
activities compete with the wildlife the park intends to protect.  Consequently, they 
generate an open conflict with the forest guards in charge of protecting the area. Those 
clashes can be quite dangerous given that some nomad shepherds are armed with guns 
                                                
35 I was personally present at an interview carried out by Prof. A. Turco and A. Converse in spring 2004, in 
which the villagers of one ethnic group openly admitted that they organised a punitive expedition to “beat up” 
villagers of another ethnic group. The reason for that was that some shepherds had lost control of their cattle, 
which entered cultivated fields and destroyed crops. In a following interview the shepherds recalled the fact, 
saying that those kinds of accidents were common because the space for grazing was limited, and they had to 
pass very close to cultivated fields.  
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or other weapons in preparation to meet the forest guards (Toutain, Compaoré et al. 
2001).  
 
4.7.3 Greater risk of violence in the APT 
The previous paragraphs of this chapter highlighted some of the problems present in 
the APT linked to environmental exploitation and protection. To my point of view, 
these potential conflicts can be clustered into two main groups (fig. 10):36  
1. clashes regarding the use of resources and; 
2. clashes related to social organization.  
 
Fig. 10 Types of conflicts in the APT 
 
The first group of conflicts is related to the access and use of the available natural 
resources. The clashes involve different categories of users planning to exploit the 
resources in different ways. Typical quarrels are those between peasant and livestock 
farmers, or between stable shepherds and nomads. Those conflicts are normally 
managed through existing problem-solving systems. The legitimacy system deals with 
those issues through traditional methods. When a solution is not found or leaves the 
                                                
36 Fig. 10 is an elaboration of a similar figure from Arbore, C., Leone G., et al. (2005).  
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parties unsatisfied, it is the legal system that takes charge of solving the disputes 
(Arbore, Leone et al. 2005). However, as pointed out by Højbjerg, conflict 
management seems to be less efficient in areas where the traditional structures have 
been fought by the colonialist or the post-colonial elites, as in Guinea (2007). 
Nevertheless, these types of clashes are not influenced by the introduction of the PAs. 
They are, however, worth being identified and mentioned, because through the 
knowledge of these existing problems it is possible to acquire useful information on 
the existing problem-solving systems used to resolve them.  
 
The second group of conflicts is related to the social organization of the local 
communities. This type of conflict can sometimes be linked to the intervention of 
AGIR in the area and to the introduction of ZCCs and ZMDs. As shown in paragraph 
4.5.2, the perception of unequal and unjust treatment can generate conflicting 
outcomes. The main problem for the implementation of the PAs within the APT 
Guinea is the risk of misreading the territorial structures and the power systems 
(legality/legitimacy). Great disappointment and frustration occurs within the 
population when the conservationists misinterpret the area of influence of a village and 
the ties within a village network, or mistake the choice of interlocutors that are 
representatives for a community. In these cases the population does not feel 
represented, or they feel that decisions are unjust and that park managers are incapable 
of understanding their world. The cause of these errors might be attributed to the 
inadequacy of actions taken by AGIR; but might also be the consequence of the wrong 
information that villagers voluntarily give out, in order to favour hidden agendas 
(4.5.2). Clashes between the population and AGIR as well as within the locals are the 
consequences of unhappiness and dissatisfaction of the residents.  The elements on 
which this community-based approach hinges, are thus extremely delicate. When 
conservationists are dealing with the dichotomy of power structures, with the 
organization of the territorial structures and with the individuation of interlocutors, 
they are operating with very delicate elements of West African society. 
Disappointment among the population, and clashes are possible unwanted outcomes. 
Another possible consequence is that villages facing injustice and disappointment, 
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decide to withdraw from protecting nature through ZCCs or  ZMDs (Arbore, Leone et 
al. 2005).  Therefore, the two main goals of AGIR: to protect the environment and to 
improve the life standards of the population; are both at great risk if mistakes are made 
in  understanding of the social organization of the local population.  
 
4.8 Summary 
 
In this chapter, the W Park and the APT Guinea have been analyzed following the 
method of structured, focused comparison (chapter 2). The model of environmental 
conflict escalation (Diehl and Gleditsch 2001), functioned as a guideline for the 
analysis. A number of issues, such as villages’ displacement and inequity in accessing 
the resources increased the risk of conflict around the W Park.  In the APT the risk of 
conflict seems to be connected to the misreading of the social organization of the local 
population, turning the elements supporting the community-based approach into a 
possible instrument of conflict escalation.  
  
In the next chapter these findings will be discussed in order to find an answer to the 
initial hypothesis.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate whether the design of protected areas can 
influence the escalation of conflict occurring between park managers and the local 
population, as well as within the local population itself. To fulfil this investigation, I 
relied on the method of structured, focused comparison in combination with 
Gleditsch’s model of environmental conflict escalation. After presenting the concepts 
behind the two different approaches of nature protection (chapter two), and the 
countries hosting the PAs (chapter three), the analysis proceeded in two parts: first the 
W Park, representing the conservationist approach was analyzed following the five 
steps of Gleditsch’s model; second, the same procedure was applied to the APT 
Guinea, representing a community-based approach (chapter four). In addition, I 
introduced some examples collected in the field research, to give the readers a better 
perception of the topic discussed.  
 
5.2 Analysis outcomes 
5.2.1 Expected outcome 
When I started this research I was quite confident that the hypothesis would be proven 
showing with a large margin that the APT community-based approach is less conflict -
prone then the W Park conservationist approach. As mentioned, this was probably 
because my field experience gave me a picture of people struggling more around the 
periphery of the W Park than in the APT. Furthermore, my personal attitude made me 
sympathize more with the APT “democratic” approach than the authoritarian style of 
the W Park; making me believe than the APT would be considerably less problematic 
in relation to conflict escalation.  
 
While researching and analyzing the two cases, my expectations have been proven 
somewhat wrong. The situation was not as simple as I expected and my black and 
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white picture shifted into a grey one. Consequently, the answer to my research 
question became less evident after starting to analyze the data.  
 
5.1.2 Findings 
Table 1 in chapter four (below), shows how the W Park presents a number of pitfalls, 
such as augmentation of population density, impoverishment of soils, degeneration of 
social structures, etc. Most of those aspects proved to have roots in the design and 
implantation of the PA, as displacement of villages and people, closing of pastoral 
paths, etc. These major issues characterizing the W Park implementation, seem to 
result in two main negative outcomes: 
1. competition between population and wildlife for the natural resources and; 
2. escalation of clashes both within the local population and towards the park 
managers.  
 
Table 1. Conflict escalation in the W Park and the APT Guinea 
CONFLICT 
ESCALATION STEPS 
SITUATION IN THE W PARK SITUATION IN THE APT 
 
Population Growth &High 
Resource Consumption Per 
Capita 
 
 High population density 
 Augmentation of consumption 
 Intensification of use of soil 
 
 Low population density 
 Use of extended fields per capita 
 
Deteriorated Environmental 
Conditions 
 
 Impoverishments of soil  Impoverishments of soil (not due 
to the APT introduction) 
 
Increasing Resources Scarcity 
 
 Decrease of livestock available per 
capita 
 Illegal exploitation of the PA 
 Seasonal overexploitation  (not due 
to the APT introduction) 
 
Inequity 
 Loss of status- degeneration of social 
structures 
 Uneven access to PA- resentment and 
conflict 
 Competition to control the PAs 
 Risk of involving wrong 
interlocutors- issues of belonging, 
resentment and conflict  
 Risk of misreading the territorial 
structures  
 
Harsher Resources 
Competition 
 Tension between stakeholders 
 Illegal exploitation of the PA  
 Further displacement - degeneration 
of social structures 
 Tension between villagers 
 
All the same, table 1 shows that also in the APT there are a number of downsides, such 
as impoverishment of soils, overexploitation, etc. However, few of them proved to 
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have direct link with the creation of the ZCCs or ZMDs. According to the data 
analyzed, quarrels in the APT seem to derive from incorrect application of the method 
used to create and implement the PAs. In other words, when the territorial structures, 
the dichotomy legality/legitimacy, the interlocutors and the local competence are 
correctly identified, the ZCCs and ZMDs, seem to be working in balance with all the 
actors. This aspect should not at all be underestimated. As showed by Geschiere, the 
pitfalls related to the use of the local community as stakeholder can escalate to forms 
of social exclusion, and even xenophobia (2004). Thus, issues of belonging have to be 
taken into consideration; to know who has the right to be represented in the 
negotiations, and who has the right to have a share of possible revenues linked the PA, 
without creating feelings of inequity and resentment. The analysis of the APT has 
proved this aspect to be the Achilles’ heel of the community-based method 
implemented in Guinea.  
 
My research question was devoted to finding out whether the community-based design 
and implementation is more effective in preventing conflict escalation than the design 
and implementation based on the conservationist approach, under West African 
circumstances.  
 
Primarily the analyses showed that the choice of design and implementation method of 
a protected area can have an impact on conflict escalation. This regards the local 
population internally, as well as their relations with the park managers. Moreover, it 
can be said that the conservationist approach seems to influence conflict escalation 
more then the community-based approach analyzed here. However, as anticipated 
above, the analysis underlined that the picture is not that clear. 
 
The analysis showed how the W Park implementation has consequences for each step 
of Gleditsh’s model of conflict escalation (table 1). In the same way, the analysis 
illustrated that conflicts in the APT appears at the level of inequity and not in the 
previous steps of the model. Finally, it can be stated that, according to this study, some 
aspects of the method implemented in the W Park are shown to directly influence the 
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conflict escalations. While, the method applied in Guinea, seems to be more effective 
in preventing conflict escalation, if all the procedures of implementation are correctly 
defined and applied.  
 
5.3 Future prospects and concluding remarks 
As stated at the beginning of this thesis, the main goal of protected areas is the 
preservation of natural resources and wildlife within their boundaries (Kamugisha, 
Stahl et al. 1997). Nevertheless, according to satellite images analyzed by Van de 
Bremer et al., up to 60% of park land in the 1990s was degrading instead of improving 
(Van de Bremer, Drijver et al. 1995). This outcome can have numerous causes, but as 
showed by the cases analyzed, one of them might well be the competition between 
local population and wildlife. It is therefore important for conservationists to evaluate 
whether a different approach towards nature protection can be more effective for 
reaching their goal. Efforts in this direction and accurate implementation of the PAs 
can be a step towards less conflicting outcomes, which can benefit the population.  
 
It would be interesting to test the hypothesis analyzed here with further studies 
engaging protected areas. One such study could investigate the introduction of the 
approach applied in the APT (community-based) in already existing protected areas 
born under the conservationist approach.  
 
Finally, it would be worthwhile seeing whether the method applied in the APT Guinea 
of deep knowledge of legality/legitimacy, territorial structures, interlocutors and local 
competence, could have further applications. This approach has shown to be rather 
composite, with the risk of being time consuming and to closely rely on the capacity of 
the individuals to understand African society and its structures. However, it would be 
interesting to test it in contexts other than nature preservation, such as factories, mines, 
oil drilling etc. A case in this direction is offered for instance in the Niger Delta. In this 
area quarrels between the local population and the oil companies seem to be linked to 
the fact that local communities feel left out from the negotiations regarding them (their 
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land and resources). In other words, people living by the Delta feel underrepresented 
and react with action of guerrillas, kidnapping, etc. (Okonta & Douglas 2003). It 
would be then valuable to see whether a deep knowledge of territorial structures and 
interlocutors could improve this situation (taking into consideration the pitfalls showed 
in this thesis).  
 
This thesis looked at environmental conflicts on a local scale. Nevertheless, the fact 
that the conflicts under analysis are not extended and/or particularly intense should not 
make us underestimate them. As pointed out by Obi, environmental issues in Africa 
often relate to wider conflicts linked to politics, ethnic claims, gender identities, etc. 
(Obi 2005). This means that claims over environmental problems can escalate. The 
consequence is conflicts with roots in multiple sectors that are more complex to 
manage and solve (Faggi and Turco 2001). When we intervene in territories already 
transformed and managed, it is important to implement strategies that diminish the risk 
of clashes on different scales.  
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